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WE ARE THE RIVER 
David Takacs** 
The New Zealand Parliament has recently granted the Whanganui 
River and the Te Urewera mountain ecosystem rights as legal persons, with 
a Māori governing board to speak for the nonhuman entities, based upon 
traditional cultural precepts. Far from an isolated precedent, in what the 
U.N. Secretary General calls “the fastest growing legal movement of the 
twenty-first century,” legislatures, courts, or voters in Australia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Bangladesh, India, Uganda, and the U.S. have also declared that 
rivers and other living systems have legal rights. 
This Article chronicles the movement to grant nonhuman entities legal 
rights. I analyze the statutes and judicial opinions driving this legal evolu-
tion, drawing extensively from interviews I conducted with key figures ne-
gotiating and advocating for these initiatives. I explain what the current 
and developing laws and judicial opinions seek to achieve. Deriving from 
disparate historical, philosophical, and legal backgrounds, they pursue dis-
parate goals; yet all of the moves to grant legal rights to nonhuman entities 
aim to enshrine in the law the fundamental symbiosis between human and 
nonhuman ecological health, and to empower suitable stewards who will 
nurture that symbiosis. I describe how newly vested spokespersons for na-
ture seek to turn novel legal theories into real legal work that protects hu-
man and nonhuman communities. I explain who now represents the nonhu-
man entity and discuss what improvements—for human and nonhuman 
communities—they hope will redound that would not have resulted from 
more traditional legal protections. I also discuss early results that have 
emerged from grants of legal personhood to nonhuman entities. 
As these laws inscribe new legal relationships between people and 
nature, they ask: what does it mean to convert from “we own the River” to 
“we are the River?” I conclude that by sanctifying the interdependent re-
lationship between human needs and healthy ecosystems, granting legal 
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rights to rivers may contribute to reversing ecological degradation in this 
century and beyond. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Human survival on a healthy planet is not a soft liberal pipe dream; it is 
sound global management and the deepest of religious impulses.” 
–Bruce Pascoe, Dark Emu1 
 
 
 1. BRUCE PASCOE, DARK EMU: ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA AND THE BIRTH OF AGRICULTURE 34 (2018). 
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In 2017, the New Zealand Parliament passed a law, with scant opposition, 
granting the Whanganui River full legal personhood.2 The legislation protects 
the entire River as “an indivisible and living whole, comprising the Whanganui 
River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating all its physical and metaphys-
ical elements.”3 The legislation includes funds to redress the local Māori people 
for past wrongs, and to support work to establish the legal framework for this 
new governance form.4 The law requires two formal appointees—one represent-
ing the New Zealand government and one representing the local Māori—who 
will speak for the inherent rights of the River.5 
This is not an isolated event. A recent article in Science proclaims, “A rights 
revolution for nature.”6 In 2014, the New Zealand government gave legal rights 
to the land that previously comprised Te Urewera National Park.7 In one man-
agement change, the Māori board selected to speak for Te Urewera’s interests 
required that rather than applying for a traditional permit, businesses wanting to 
operate in the area must negotiate friendship agreements that detail how they will 
“demonstrate loyal affection to Te Urewera values and her need to continue her 
complex balancing act among living systems.”8 The government of Victoria, 
Australia has created a governing council (including indigenous representatives) 
that will speak for the Yarra River’s interests in planning and in legal disputes.9 
Indigenous activists and other local citizens in Australia are lobbying to similarly 
designate the Margaret River, Fitzroy River, and Great Barrier Reef as entities 
 
 2. The Whanganui River is 180 miles long, the third longest River in New Zealand. DAVID R. BOYD, THE 
RIGHTS OF NATURE: A LEGAL REVOLUTION THAT COULD SAVE THE WORLD 141 (2017).   
 3. Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, pt 2, s 12 (N.Z.). 
 4. Id. at pt 3, s 70. 
 5. Id. at pt 2, s 20; see Whananui River Legally Recognized as Living Entity, New Zealand, ENV’T JUST. 
ATLAS (June 19, 2017), https://ejatlas.org/conflict/rights-of-nature-new-zealand [https://perma.cc/GV44-Z7YZ]; 
Eleanor Ainge Roy, New Zealand River Granted Same Legal Rights as Human Being, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2017, 
12:50 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-rights-as-
human-being [https://perma.cc/5RB9-HVRM]; First Te Pou Tupua Appointed, SCOOP INDEP. NEWS (Sept. 12, 
2017, 12:39 PM), http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1709/S00132/first-te-pou-tupua-appointed-4917.htm 
[https://perma.cc/MQU6-YDKT]. 
 6. Guillaume Chapron, Yaffa Epstein & José Vicente López-Bao, A Rights Revolution for Nature, 363 
SCI. 1392, 1392 (Mar. 29, 2019). 
 7. Te Urewera Act 2014, pt 1, s 7 (N.Z.). 
 8. TE UREWERA BOARD, TUHOE, TE KAWA O TE UREWERA 53, www.ngaituhoe.iwi.nz/te-kawa-o-te-
urewera (last visited Jan. 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/GKD8-526Y]. The legislation notes that the mountain and 
surroundings are “ancient and enduring, a fortress of nature, alive with history; its scenery is abundant with . . . 
remote beauty.” Te Urewera Act 2014, pt 1, s 3 (N.Z.). The Māori Board’s initial guidelines stress that it “is 
about the management of people for the benefit of the land. It is not about land management. It raises hope for a 
renewed collective responsibility for our people [sic] impact on the land and foresees our disciplined response to 
those impacts.” TĀMATI KRUGER, TUHOE, TE KAWA O TE UREWERA 7, http://www.ngaituhoe.iwi.nz/te-kawa-o-
te-urewera (last visited Jan. 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/PJS5-MX5B]. 
 9. Yarra River Protection (Wilip-gin Birrarung murron) Act 2017 (Vict.) pt 1, s 1 (Austl.); Government 
of Victoria, Minister for Water, New Body to Protect and Promote the Yarra River, PREMIER OF VICT.: THE HON. 
DANIEL ANDREWS (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.premier.vic.gov.au/new-body-protect-and-promote-yarra-river 
[https://perma.cc/2TGV-S2VL]. 
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bearing legal rights, with formal representatives (primarily Aboriginal 
Australians) to act as guardians ad litem for them.10 
The Colombian Constitutional Court has ordered government entities to 
recognize the rights of the Río Atrato, including developing a plan to reverse 
degradation of the River; similar to the New Zealand precedent, the Court 
required appointment of one government and one community delegate to 
represent the rights of the River.11 Courts in India, Bangladesh, and Ecuador have 
also recognized rivers’ legal rights, with concomitant orders to governments to 
fulfill those rights by remediating and preventing pollution.12 In the United States 
in March 2019, citizens in Toledo, Ohio voted to give Lake Erie legal 
personhood, connoting the Lake’s right “to exist, flourish, and naturally evolve,” 
with a full charter that lays out the rights thus granted to the Lake.13 Similar 
“rights of nature” initiatives have been passed in various municipalities in the 
U.S.14 
This exercise in creative environmental law remained largely within the 
realm of speculation until very recently: we now seem to be in a watershed 
moment15 in the drive to grant legal rights to rivers, lakes, and mountains. Why 
 
 10. See Fitzroy River Declaration (Nov. 2–3, 2016), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/environskim-
berley/pages/303/attachments/original/1512653115/fitzroy-river-declaration.pdf?1512653115 
[https://perma.cc/FD4L-953E]; Jane Gleeson-White, It’s Only Natural: The Push to Give Rivers, Mountains, and 
Forests Legal Rights, GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2018, 10:33 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/ 
2018/apr/01/its-only-natural-the-push-to-give-rivers-mountains-and-forests-legal-rights [https://perma.cc/R3RQ 
-P74G]; Legal Rights of the Great Barrier Reef Bill 2018 (Queensl.) pt 1 s 3 (Austl.). 
 11. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 10, 2016, Sentencia T-622/16, Relatoría 
de la Corte Constitucional [R.C.C.] (§ 10.2) (Colom.), translated in Dignity Rts. Project, Del. L. Sch., Judgment 
T-622/16 (The Atrato River Case) 110 (2019), https://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/riveratratodeci-
sionenglishdrpdellaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RCL-TCLC]; David R. Boyd, Recognizing the Rights of Nature: 
Lofty Rhetoric or Legal Revolution?, 32 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 13, 17 (2018).  
 12. R.F. Wheeler and E.G. Huddle v. Attorney Gen. of the State of Loja, Corte Provincial de Justicia de 
Loja [Loja Provincial Court of Justice] Mar. 30, 2011, Judgment No. 11121-2011-0010 (Ecuador); Michael Safi, 
Ganges and Yamuna Rivers Granted Same Legal Rights as Human Beings, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2017, 7:44 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/21/ganges-and-yamuna-rivers-granted-same-legal-rights-as-hu-
man-beings [https://perma.cc/Z325-FERE]; Rina Chandran, Fear of Evictions as Bangladesh Givers Rivers  
Legal Rights, REUTERS (July 5, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-landrights-riv-
ers/fears-of-evictions-as-bangladesh-gives-rivers-legal-rights-idUSKCN1TZ1ZR [https://perma.cc/8R54-
FT9W]. But see India’s Ganges and Yamua Rivers Are ‘Not Living Entities’, BBC NEWS (July 7, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-40537701 [https://perma.cc/6PVZ-X753]. 
 13. The initiative passed with 61.39% of the vote. Timothy Williams, Legal Rights for Lake Erie? Voters 
in Ohio City Will Decide., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/17/us/lake-erie-legal-
rights.html [https://perma.cc/V5B3-6L4P]; see Tom Henry, Lake Erie Legal Rights Gets Approval from Toledo 
Voters, TOLEDO BLADE (FEB. 26, 2019, 9:48 PM), https://www.toledoblade.com/local/politics/2019/02/26/Lake-
Erie-Bill-of-Rights-gets-approval-from-Toledo-voters/stories/20190226159' [https://perma.cc/N4RK-7HYL]. A 
lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the initiative has been filed; similar efforts in the U.S. have been 
rendered meaningless or struck down by courts. See, e.g., Peggy Kirk Hall, Ellen Essman & Evin Bachelor, The 
Lake Erie Bill of Rights Ballot Initiative, OHIO ST. UNIV. EXTENSION: IN THE WEEDS (Feb. 8, 2019), https://far-
moffice.osu.edu/sites/aglaw/files/site-library/Lake%20Erie%20Bill%20of%20Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6 
V2-XJ3F]. 
 14. See Hall et al., supra note 13. 
 15. A bit of environmental law humor there. 
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give legal rights to rivers? How to avoid making this, in the words of a Wired 
article, “a patchouli-soaked Gaia fantasy translated into legalese?”16 
Indigenous cultures around the world are guided by creation stories that 
sanctify relationships between human and nonhuman communities;17 written 
into local lore and thus local law, these stories are themselves ecological 
adaptations that encourage stewardship to avoid despoiling the ecosystems that 
upon which these cultures directly depend.18 Until now, though, such lore and 
laws have found little purchase in modern, Western19 legal systems. In his now-
famous 1972 law review article,20 Should Trees Have Legal Standing?, 
Christopher Stone addresses the title question and declares: “I am quite seriously 
proposing that we give legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called 
‘natural objects’ in the environment…,”21 a proposition that at least one U.S. 
Supreme Court justice has enthusiastically endorsed.22 Until very recently, 
however, the idea did not take root in the real world.23 
In this Article, I examine this burgeoning phenomenon and ask: what is 
now going on here? What does it mean to give a river or lake or mountain legal 
rights, and what meaningful legal work does this do that could not be 
accomplished with more traditional legal mechanisms? Who is advocating for 
this, and why? Given that the idea has been floating around for decades, why and 
how is it achieving legal success now? And, ultimately, what does it mean for 
our relationship with the Earth and for human and nonhuman communities? 
While humans have gradually expanded the circle of entities to which we 
owe ethical, and thus legal, obligations,24 giving rights to rivers promotes a more 
expansive ecological democracy:25 as part of the legal implementation of these 
 
 16. Brandon Keim, Nature to Get Legal Rights in Bolivia, WIRED (Apr. 18, 2011, 6:10 PM), https://www. 
wired.com/2011/04/legal-rights-nature-bolivia/ [https://perma.cc/48HQ-L7K5]. 
 17. See, e.g., India’s Ganges and Yamua Rivers Are ‘Not Living Entities’, supra note 12. 
 18. See Gleeson-White, supra note 10. 
 19. I have chosen “Western” as opposed to “Northern,” “developed,” or “industrialized.” Each formulation 
has its shortcomings, but “Western” does not offend those in Australia/New Zealand, does not suggest that in 
some ways some nations have completed some perfect path (in fact, this paper suggests that those of us who 
think we live in “developed” nations may still have a long road to travel), and does not define one cluster of 
nations by their means of economic production. 
 20. Sometimes not an oxymoron! 
 21. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?–Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 450, 456 (1972). 
 22. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–42, 749–50, 750 n.8 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 23. See Boyd, supra note 11, at 13. 
 24. In his Sierra Club v. Morton dissent, Justice Douglas cites both Christopher Stone, supra note 21, and 
pioneering wildlife biologist and environmental ethicist Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic” from A Sand County Al-
manac (1949), see Morton, 405 U.S. at 741–42, 752, whose core quote has become a famous environmental 
maxim: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty, and stability of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: AND SKETCHES 
HERE AND THERE 224–25 (1949). In the influential The Rights of Nature (1989), environmental philosopher Ro-
derick Nash writes that “Ecology widens the circle” of ethical obligations to include nonhuman species and en-
tities such as Rivers. RODERICK NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 55 
(1989). 
 25. For an explication of ecological and environmental democracy, see David Takacs, Whose Voices Count 
in Biodiversity Conservation? Ecological Democracy in Biodiversity Offsetting, REDD+, and Rewilding, 22 J. 
  
550 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
new rights, governments are devolving legal guardianship26 to local citizens, 
often those who have historically been excluded from controlling their own 
essential ecological resources.27 While science and the experts who deploy it will 
continue to play important roles in determining the parameters of ecosystem 
health when naming what a river might want or need, this movement prioritizes 
new voices (or voices that have been silenced) to speak for and sustain Earth’s 
life-support resources. For example, in New Zealand, the movement to grant the 
Māori these legal rights and responsibilities is part of a broader, formal legal 
movement to atone and compensate for past colonial depredations.28 Thus, not 
only does the Whanganui River or Te Urewera gain rights of their own, but the 
disenfranchised, colonized Māori now also have equal (or dominant) voices at 
the table when deciding the fate of the River.  
For a sustainable—or any—human future, I believe we need a fundamental 
shift in how we view the natural world and our relationships with it.29 Our ideas 
about the nonhuman world themselves become ecological actors, shaping our 
ethics and therefore our behaviors towards the nonhuman world.30 Legal 
solutions that reflect and reinforce an expanded circle of moral concern tilt the 
balance more towards stewardship and restoration over use and degradation.31 A 
remade planet further shapes our ideas about the nonhuman world around us.32 
In this Article, I chronicle the current movement to grant rights to rivers, 
lakes, mountains, and other ecosystem elements.33 In addition to analyzing the 
statutes and judicial opinions driving this legal evolution, I draw extensively 
from interviews I have conducted with those who have fomented and are 
implementing these legal initiatives.34 I explain what the current and developing 
laws and judicial opinions seek to achieve.35 Deriving from disparate historical, 
philosophical, and legal backgrounds, they pursue disparate goals; yet all of the 
moves to grant legal rights to nonhuman entities aim to enshrine in the law the 
 
ENV’T POL’Y & PLAN. 43, 45 (2020); David Takacs, Environmental Democracy and Forest Carbon (REDD+), 
44 ENV’T L. 71, 71 (2014). 
 26. See discussion infra Section III.A.5 for why some groups do not like the term “guardianship.” 
 27. For this perspective on the Whanganui settlement, see Katherine Sanders, ‘Beyond Human Owner-
ship’? Property, Power and Legal Personality for Nature in Aotearoa New Zealand, 30 J. ENV’T L. 207, 231 
(2018). 
 28. Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes argues that by recognizing the rights of the Whanganui River and Te 
Urewera mountain and National Park, the government was really offering formal legal recognition of Māori 
cosmology, with concordant control of resources that had been robbed from them during colonization. Catherine 
J. Iorns Magallanes, Nature as an Ancestor: Two Examples of Legal Personality for Nature in New Zealand 16 
(Vict. Univ. Wellington Legal Research Paper No. 54/2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3532319 [https://perma.cc/MK7J-JUYP].  My interviews with Gerrard Albert and Christopher Finalyson 
confirmed this interpretation. 
 29. Even that sentence needs rethinking: It poses a dualism between us and the natural world: We are apart 
from it, not a part of it. 
 30. This is one of the main theses of my book, DAVID TAKACS, THE IDEA OF BIODIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHIES 
OF PARADISE 119 (1996). 
 31. See id. at 20. 
 32. See id. at 156. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
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fundamental symbiosis between human and nonhuman ecological health, and to 
empower suitable stewards who will nurture that symbiosis.36 I describe how 
newly vested spokespersons for nature seek to turn novel legal theories into real 
legal work that protects human and nonhuman communities.37 I discuss what 
advancements—for human and nonhuman communities—the legal guardians 
hope will result that would not have resulted from more traditional legal 
protections, and discuss early repercussions that have emerged from grants of 
legal personhood to nonhuman entities.38 I conclude by speculating that by 
sanctifying the interdependent relationship between human needs and healthy 
ecosystems, granting legal rights to rivers may contribute to reversing ecological 
degradation in this century and beyond.39 
In other words, as these laws inscribe new legal relationships between 
people and nature, they force us to ask: what does it mean, practically, to move 
from “we own the River” to “we are the River?” 
II. BACKGROUND: WHERE DID THIS MOVEMENT COME FROM? 
According to the U.N. Secretary General’s Harmony with Nature report, 
“Earth jurisprudence can be seen as the fastest growing legal movement of the 
twenty-first century. The most significant consequence of acknowledging human 
interconnectedness and inextricability from the rest of the world has been casting 
the non-human world as a legal subject . . . .”40 In the moves to grant rights to 
nature, we see extensive cross-pollination across jurisdictions in deriving these 
legal innovations, a kind of ecological interrelationship or flow of legal energy 
among legal systems responding to the evolving belief that human-nonhuman 
interdependence must be enshrined in the law. 
The number of environmental laws has grown thirty-eight-fold since 1972, 
with legislation included in virtually every nation.41 Eighty-eight nations grant 
their citizens the right to a healthy environment, and sixty-two have these rights 
enshrined in their Constitutions.42 But for all of the legal advances we’ve made 
on behalf of environmental protection, Earth’s life support systems continue to 
erode at an alarming rate.43 Humans are causing a synergism of unchecked 
(greenhouse gas and otherwise) pollution and species extinction, which will 
continue to redound to our detriment.44 The human population is projected to 
 
 36. See id. 
 37. See infra Part IV. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See infra Part V. 
 40. U.N. Secretary-General, Harmony with Nature, ¶ 129, U.N. Doc. A/74/326 (July 26, 2019). 
 41. Dramatic Growth in Laws to Protect Environment, but Widespread Failure to Enforce, Finds Report, 
ENV’T LAW INST. (Jan. 2019), https://www.eli.org/news/dramatic-growth-laws-protect-environment-widespread 
-failure-enforce-finds-report [https://perma.cc/M3N8-Y8AT]. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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grow to nine billion by 2050 and likely to 11 billion by 2100,45 while the average 
person’s buying power and consumption will grow by 150%.46 The International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) forecasts more than 28,000 species 
threatened with extinction, i.e. 27% of all the species they have assessed: 40% of 
amphibian species, 25% of mammal species, and 14% of bird species face grave 
extinction threats.47 
The movement towards a jurisprudence rooted in respect for the 
interdependence between humans and nature posits that in order to survive and 
thrive going forward, in a world of 7 or 11 (or however many) billion people, we 
must stop pretending that our existences as individuals, as communities, as a 
species does not fundamentally depend on the nonhuman world.48 This means a 
radical—to the roots—rejiggering of our legal system towards sanity. As 
Thomas Berry puts it, “We need legal structures and political establishments that 
will know that our way into the future is not through relentless industrial 
development but through the living forces that brought us into being and are the 
only forces that can sustain us in the coming centuries.”49 
Mainstream, anthropocentric environmental law often conceives of, and 
thus, regulates nonhuman ecological entities and processes as malleable at our 
behest: the natural world is a buffet of resources to fulfill human desires, and we 
regulate accordingly.50 If, as the laws I chronicle here purport to do, we viewed 
nature as an independent entity with inherent value and thus, inherent rights, with 
which we are symbiotically entwined, we would ask: what does this river or lake 
or mountain require to achieve its full potential? Human needs would then 
necessarily be constrained to fit within the bounds of functional ecosystems. Or 
we would recognize as the only sensible and sustainable way forward the 
essential symbiosis between human and nonhuman, and we would ask: how do 
we reconfigure our laws to recognize and thus regulate both human and 
nonhuman communities in interdependent, synergistic relationship?  
Most of the ideas I describe in this Article are not new. In fact, they are 
very, very old, as their proponents consistently point out, formulated and 
 
 45. I find those figures difficult to believe, given how we are undercutting our systems of life support. 
Damian Carrington, World Population to Hit 11bn in 2100—With 70% Chance of Continuous Rise, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/sep/18/world-population-new-study-11bn-
2100 [perma.cc/G7BQ-J33S]; Population, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/pop-
ulation/ [perma.cc/9FJA-3KNF]. 
 46. B. Miller, M. E. Soulé & J. Terborgh, Letter to the Editor, ‘New Conservation’ or Surrender to Devel-
opment?, ANIMAL CONSERVATION 2 (2014), http://www.esf.edu/efb/parry/Invert_Cons_14_Readings/Miller_ 
etal_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW8X-SFRH]. 
 47. IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES, https://www.iucnredlist.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/AB47-GWU8]. 
 48. Maria Niera, Our Lives Depend on a Healthy Planet, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 3, 2015), https:// 
www.who.int/mediacentre/commentaries/healthy-planet/en/ [https://perma.cc/KJK7-QJV7]. 
 49. Thomas Berry, Forward to CORMAC CULLINAN, WILD LAW: A MANIFESTO FOR EARTH JUSTICE 21 (2d 
ed. 2017). 
 50. Cameron La Follette, Rights of Nature: The New Paradigm,  AM. ASS’N GEOGRAPHERS (Mar. 6, 2019), 
http://news.aag.org/2019/03/rights-of-nature-the-new-paradigm/ [perma.cc/TXC9-SAUT]. 
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practiced for millennia by indigenous peoples around the globe.51 As the UN 
Secretary General’s report puts it: 
The Earth-centred paradigm guided by the oldest jurisprudential traditions 
of humankind is inherently pluralistic. Harmony with Nature depends on 
respecting, protecting and nurturing diversity–of ecosystems, land and 
seascapes, cultures and traditions. Harmony with Nature calls for a deep 
appreciation of the many ways of being that life–not just human life, but 
all life–has imagined.52 
It is new, though, that these ideas are now being implemented in Western 
law, their values informing the kinds of mindful, compassionate governance that 
reflect the core values of the communities entrusted with implementing these 
ideas in situ.53 And the foundational ideas—that we are fundamentally 
interconnected with the nonhuman world (so even to write a sentence like that 
positing two separate entities is inaccurate)—are backed by ecological science 
showing the depth of these interconnections and human dependence on 
nonhuman species and ecosystem processes that undergird human existence.54  
While some developing world scholars and activists have criticized the 
entire international human rights legal system as reflecting and reifying Western 
ideas and power structures,55 here the movement for rights for nonhuman entities 
is often driven by, and affords legal power to, marginalized indigenous or rural 
communities.56 Note that the movement to give rights to rivers differs from legal 
mechanisms that afford individuals the right to a healthy environment or to some 
specific environmental amenity, such as the right to clean, safe drinking water. 
While these legal advancements recognize and root in the law our 
interdependence with the natural world, those legal provisions still conceive of 
nature as existing to satisfy our needs.57 Posing legal obligations in terms of 
“rights” connotes ethical obligations (some more inviolable than others) that 
exert normative and legal power over our behaviors and can be a complement or 
a corrective to utilitarian, market-based solutions.58 As a recent Science paper 
notes, “When people and corporations have rights and nature does not, nature 
frequently loses, as evidenced by the continuing deterioration of the 
environment. Rights of nature may help to prevent this one-sided outcome.”59 
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Government support for environmental protection may ebb and flow, but it is 
more difficult to revoke protections for entities who are seen as having an 
inherent moral right to thrive, particularly when that view is memorialized in 
law.60 
Ships and corporations may have legal rights; nature usually does not.61 
Activists are also seeking to grant nonhuman animals the same legal rights as 
humans.62 For example, the Nonhuman Rights Project “is the only civil rights 
organization in the United States dedicated solely to securing rights for 
nonhuman animals,”63 especially megavertebrates like great apes64 and 
elephants.65 These efforts are nonetheless about respecting individual animals 
whose qualities (sentience, emotional complexity, intelligence) mirror our 
own.66 Worthy in their own right, these efforts are not directly about respecting 
our relationship to the broader ecological world and writing that into the law, nor 
empowering those communities who are most intimately connected to that world 
to have a say in how that law gets implemented.67 
This is what I seek to document here. The experiments I portray are 
intriguing starting points for what it would mean to restructure law and 
governance to reflect the needs of a nonhuman entity, and to recognize the human 
communities’ inextricable dependence upon and interrelationship with that 
nonhuman entity. 
A. Christopher Stone and Legal Standing for Nonhuman Entities 
Professor Christopher D. Stone’s 1972 essay, Should Trees Have 
Standing?–Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, set a template in Western 
legal circles for why, and with what implications, nonhuman entities might 
themselves acquire legal rights.68 Noting that “[t]hroughout legal history, each 
successive extension of rights to some new entity has been, theretofore a bit 
unthinkable,”69 Stone opines that a: 
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[R]adical new conception of man’s relationship to the rest of nature would 
not only be a step towards solving the material planetary problems…. If we only 
stop for a moment and look at the underlying human qualities that our present 
attitudes toward property and nature draw upon and reinforce, we have to be 
struck by how stultifying of our own personal growth and satisfaction they can 
become. . . .”70 
For a nonhuman entity to have legal rights, someone can institute legal 
actions on its behalf; injury to it must be considered; and relief from injuries must 
flow to its benefit.71 Stone decries that under our present, shortsighted legal 
system, if a polluter is held liable for polluting a waterway, “no money goes to 
benefit of the stream itself to repair its damages.”72 Natural objects have been 
mere “objects for man to conquer and master and use.”73 Instead, Stone argues, 
we must see that we are in relationship to, and dependent on, the rest of nature:74 
“I do not think it too remote that we may come to regard the Earth, as some have 
suggested, as one organism, of which Mankind is a functional part–the mind, 
perhaps: different from the rest of nature, but different as a man’s brain is from 
his lungs.”75 
As Stone was clearly aware, “[t]o shift from such a lofty fancy as the 
planetarization of consciousness to the operation of our municipal legal system 
is to come down to earth hard.”76 He presaged an incipient hearing of Sierra Club 
v. Morton, where the Supreme Court “may find itself in a position to award 
‘rights’ in a way that will contribute to a change in popular consciousness. It 
would be a modest move, to be sure, but one in furtherance of a large goal: the 
future of the planet as we know it.”77 
And, indeed, in a now well-known dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Douglas cites Stone’s work.78 Noting that “Permitting a 
court to appoint a representative of an inanimate object would not be 
significantly different from customary judicial appointments of guardians ad 
litem, executors, conservators, receivers, or council for indigents,”79 Justice 
Douglas suggests that the suit should “be more properly labeled as Mineral King 
v. Morton.”80 Justice Douglas opines: 
The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or 
nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, 
and all other animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy 
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it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the 
ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a meaningful 
relation to that body of water—whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a 
zoologist, or a logger—must be able to speak for the values which the river 
represents and which are threatened with destruction.81 
Describing a philosophy that we will see mirrored in current arguments on 
granting rights to nonhuman entities, Justice Douglas concludes: 
Ecology reflects the land ethic; and Aldo Leopold wrote in A Sand County 
Almanac . . . ‘The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the 
community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the 
land.’ That, as I see it, is the issue of ‘standing’ in the present case and 
controversy.82 
Justice Douglas’ expansive notion of legal “community” did not win, at least not 
that day. 
B. Thomas Berry, Cormac Cullinan, and Earth Jurisprudence 
At a 2001conference, philosopher Thomas Berry presented a set of 
principles that have formed a gospel to guide thinking about rights for nonhuman 
nature.83 These notions inform some of the modern efforts analyzed in this 
Article. For example, one Principle states that “Every component of the Earth 
community, both living and non-living has three rights: the right to be, the right 
to a habitat or place to be, and the right to fulfill its role in the ever-renewing 
process of the Earth Community.”84 Another Principle states: 
These rights as presented here are based on the intrinsic relations that the 
various components on Earth have to each other. Planet Earth is a single 
community bound together with interdependent relationships. No living 
being nourishes itself. Each component of the Earth community is 
immediately or mediately dependent of every other member of the 
community for the nourishment and assistance it needs for its own 
survival . . . .85 
For Thomas Berry, human-made law does not “grant” rights to nature; rather, we 
recognize the existing rights created when the Earth formed, and its evolutionary 
processes unfurled.86 
In his book Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice, Cormac Cullinan 
molded Berry’s preachings into “Earth Jurisprudence.”87 He writes: 
If we are to halt and reverse the process of degrading Earth we must 
completely revise how we govern ourselves. Thomas Berry and others are 
correct when they draw attention to the fact that this will require us to move 
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away from some of the fundamental beliefs and the mythologies so dear to 
the cultures that currently dominate world society.88 
The most fundamental misconception is our failure to: 
[R]ecognise that every aspect of our well-being is derived from Earth. The 
conscious reintegration of human societies into the Earth Community will 
not be possible until we can conceive of an Earth jurisprudence that allows 
us once more to assume our rightful place as an integral part of the larger 
community of beings.89 
Cullinan advocates that our legal systems must overcome the “obsessively 
anthropocentric”90 “core falsehood . . . that we humans are separate from our 
environment and that we can flourish even as the health of the Earth 
deteriorates.”91 By remaking, from the roots up, human legal systems to put the 
Earth community at the core, we turn away from our “catastrophically 
destructive” current path and guarantee human health and survival of our 
species.92 Cullinan acknowledges such a radical paradigm shift is fraught with 
difficulty, but “[s]ince human beings have no future on Earth unless we are able 
to do so, being deterred by the difficulties is tantamount to acquiescing to 
extinction.”93  
Cullinan advocates for indigenous communities seeking legal autonomy: 
“Their plea is for the dominant culture (represented by the national government) 
to cease trying to impose its idea of an appropriate human role on their 
relationships with one another and with the Earth Community as a whole.”94 This 
will be among his many ideas that find legal expression in the innovations below. 
C. People’s Tribunals on Rights of Nature 
In 2010, about 30,000 people from over 100 nations attended the “World 
People’s Congress on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth” in 
Cochabamba, Bolivia.95 Cochabamba had been the site of community unrest and 
successful reversal of plans to give the city’s water supply to a private 
corporation.96 Attendees drafted a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother 
Earth, which forms the legal basis for the International Tribunal for the Rights of 
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Nature and Mother Earth.97 The goal of the Tribunals, which have met five times, 
is to provide “a vehicle for reframing and adjudicating prominent environmental 
and social justice cases within the context of a Rights of Nature based earth 
jurisprudence.”98 And so, for example, at the Bonn 2017 conference (which 
featured nine judges, including Cormac Cullinan), fifty-three people from 
nineteen countries gave presentations, and attendees heard cases on water 
deprivation in Spain, mining in a protected forest in Germany, and false 
commodification of nature in REDD+ schemes.99 
Local tribunals have also been held in the U.S. and Australia.100 The 
Australian Peoples’ Tribunal for Community and Nature’s Rights was created 
with a charter that refers to the Universal Declaration, but also recognizes the 
ancient “First Laws” of the First Nations Peoples of Australia.101 The main goals 
of these tribunals, according to Dr. Michelle Maloney, National Convenor of the 
Australian Earth Laws Alliance, is to “give a voice to the voiceless: to allow 
people to speak for nature and challenge the destructive practices that industrial 
society normalized throughout the 20th century,” and to collectively offer an 
alternative vision of what non-anthropocentric law could look like.102 Rights for 
nonhuman entities forms part of the legal corpus for that alternative vision.103 
The U.S.-based Earth Law Center promotes “the idea that ecosystems 
should have the right to exist, thrive, and evolve–and that nature should be able 
to defend its rights in courts, just like people can.”104 Their team of lawyers 
specializes in amicus briefs in courts around the world explaining legal rights for 
natural entities.105 They are working with local activists to accrue rights for 
Bosnia’s Doljanka River, Pakistan’s Indus River, and Nigeria’s River Ethiope, 
and for natural forests in El Salvador and ecosystems in Serbia.106 
These global alliances explicitly fuse modern and traditional norms to set 
out an alternative, Earth-based legal framework that replaces hierarchy with 
relationship, and emphasizes interdependence with Earth systems rather than 
dominance over them.107 While commentators sometimes frame the legal 
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developments I analyze in this Article as a turn towards ecocentrism,108 in reality, 
they blur the bounds between anthropocentric and ecocentric worldviews.109 
While the nonhuman entity is the focus of the new legal forms, stories told to 
buttress local claims to speak for the nonhuman are still grounded in relationships 
between the human and nonhuman communities, including what the nonhuman 
entity provides to the local community.110 
“Rights for Rivers” is really–at least in some incarnations–biocultural 
rights, i.e. rights for communities that have traditionally relied upon and revered 
the nonhuman world that cradles them.111 But they need not be the traditional 
communities. Even urban, modernized Western communities are recognizing 
that existing laws are inadequate to protect nonhuman communities (and thus 
protect themselves), and a new set of ethics recognizing this interdependence is 
becoming rooted in the law.112 
III. RIGHTS FOR RIVERS AROUND THE WORLD 
In this section, I chronicle the cross-fertilizing legal moves to grant 
nonhuman entities legal rights in disparate nations. All recognize the 
fundamental interconnectedness between indigenous and/or rural communities 
and the nonhuman ecosystems upon which they depend, and most empower these 
communities to speak for what the river or mountain might need.   
I proceed nonchronologically, starting with New Zealand, where the 
national government has enacted the globe’s most progressive statutes that grant 
nonhuman entities legal personhood, provide road maps for how those grants 
should be implemented, and empower local indigenous communities to govern 
and speak for the legal persons. The section features extensive insights from my 
interviews with some of the prime Māori and government leaders responsible for 
the legal revolution. I move to Colombia, where the Constitutional Court’s 
declaration of legal personhood for the Río Atrato provides the most sweeping 
analysis yet of the need for a new, ecocentric legal form; this section is enlivened 
by my interview with the author of the opinion, Chief Justice Jorge Iván Palacio. 
I move to Australia, where the Victorian government has granted a legal voice 
to the Yarra River with a governing body who will speak for the River’s interests. 
I include interviews with Anne Poelina, a traditional Aboriginal elder who is 
advocating for rights for the rivers that sustain her community in northwestern 
Australia, and for rights for the traditional owners to speak for what the land 
needs. I also describe decisions in Bangladesh, India, and Ecuador, where courts 
have attempted to remedy environmental destruction through the mechanism of 
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granting rights to rivers, and I conclude with recent developments in the United 
States. 
A. New Zealand 
1. Overview 
New Zealand has granted legal personhood to a mountain ecosystem, Te 
Urewera, and to the Whanganui River.113 These designations have received 
widespread press. For example, National Geographic begins their coverage 
dramatically: “Cloud-shrouded Ngauruhoe—mythical Mount Doom in Peter 
Jackson’s The Lord of the Rings—is one of the sacred mountains of New 
Zealand’s central North Island, birthplace of the Whanganui River.”114 
New Zealand granted both entities legal personhood not by judicial order, 
but by statute.115 A potent blend of ingredients combined to result in legal forms 
that reflect the Māori worldview in hitherto unformulated ways. The New 
Zealand government acknowledges they have violated treaty obligations, and 
seeks to make amends;116 the Māori demonstrate longstanding, well-documented 
cultural traditions that render their claims inarguably authentic;117 ecological 
science buttresses Māori understandings of their interconnectedness with the 
natural world;118 all parties seem able to hold disparate worldviews in parallel, 
and to respect those worldviews;119 and, fortuitously, key justice-seeking players 
emerged and acted at the right time.120 Even though the novel legal forms that 
have resulted are endemic to the particulars of New Zealand law and history, 
they now influence human/nonhuman relationships and the law that governs 
those relationships elsewhere on the globe.121 
New Zealand, surprisingly, does not join the majority of the world’s nations 
in recognizing a human right to a healthy environment, or to safe, clean water.122 
Such proclamations, and laws implementing them, have been steps forward to 
recognizing that human wellbeing depends upon functioning, healthy 
ecosystems.123 But these rights are still anthropocentric and individualistic: I 
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have a right to a resource that must be stewarded for my wellbeing.124 The new 
legal forms in New Zealand move from an anthropocentric notion of rights (what 
can nature provide me?) to an anthro-ecocentric notion: the law is still first and 
foremost a reflection of human beliefs and human needs, but the law situates 
those needs in a web of interrelatedness where the nonhuman world looks after 
us as we look after it, with those connections so entwined that there is no “us” 
and “it”–we are the River, and the River is us. 
2. Treaty of Waitangi 
To understand current legal innovations in New Zealand, one must 
understand a bit about the Treaty of Waitangi and its interpretations. The Treaty’s 
cultural (mis)understandings, and explicit and acknowledged Crown violations 
provide the historical, legal milieu for understanding how rivers and mountains 
have gained legal personhood in New Zealand.  
Many, but not all, Māori Chiefs signed the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi with 
British Crown representatives.125 Some British colonizers did have humanitarian 
concerns, but first and foremost, they desired to gain control–sovereignty–over 
Māori lands.126 From the beginnings of negotiations between Crown and Māori, 
differences in worldview failed to find precise meaning in legal terms; as 
historian Claudia Orange expresses this, with considerable understatement: “As 
for Māori understanding of the Treaty, it left much to be desired.”127  
Central to ongoing disagreements was the notion of “sovereignty.” Even 
today, Western lawyers don’t agree on what, precisely, the word “sovereignty” 
does mean, or should mean in an era when—be it greenhouse gas pollution or 
any other damages—environmental harm transcends cartographic boundaries.128 
It is clear that in 1840, the various Treaty of Waitangi signatories shared no 
common understanding of what sovereignty over land meant or what rights they 
were accruing or conceding.129 For the 19th century colonizers, “sovereignty” 
conveyed dominion and control in a familiar, Western sense.130 The Māori 
shared no such worldview, and have long held that they signed onto the 
translation into Māori “kāwanatanga” that was fundamentally different from how 
the colonizers saw their relationship to the land;131 had the translation been more 
accurate, the chiefs would not have signed.132 Subsequent new translations of the 
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Treaty have conveyed different meanings of key terms that controlled peoples’ 
relationships with their surroundings; those translations have guided settlement 
agreements, even if they don’t represent the original understandings the parties 
held in 1840.133 Through Waitangi Tribunal proceedings, the government has 
admitted it has repeatedly breached both Māori and English versions of the text 
with respect to Māori control over environmental resources.134 
The Treaty represented and continues to represent contested meanings of 
relationships to the nonhuman world, and of communities’ rights to define those 
relationships as they wish.135 We cannot separate government attempts to 
subjugate Māori from desires for the “resources” with which the Māori had 
relations for centuries.136 For the Māori, self-determination meant ability to 
define their relationship with rivers and mountains as a vehicle for controlling 
the resources on which they have always depended.137 Of course, the Māori 
definition of “self” was more expansive than the colonizers (and their 
descendants, until recently) could visualize.138 
Only now has the Crown acceded to a “law” of relationships between 
human and nonhuman that honors the Māori worldview.139 
3. Background/Waitangi Tribunal and Court Decisions  
‘Te Awa Tupua—the Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act of 2017—
establishes legal personhood for the Whanganui River and honors the local Māori 
communities’ close and longstanding relationship to the River.140 
Previous New Zealand statutes included precursors to the hybrid legal 
forms that emerged in the 2010s. For example, Section 6 of the 1991 Resource 
Management Act requires that all persons acting under the Act “shall recognise 
and provide for . . . the relationship of Māori and their culture and traditions with 
their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu [sacred places141], and other taonga 
[prized possessions142]. . . .”143 Section 7(a) requires that all must pay “particular 
regard to—kaitiakitanga,” or traditional Māori stewardship.144 Court decisions 
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also required that water managers must consider Māori spiritual relationships 
with the waters in question; courts have ruled that development projects need be 
modified or scuttled due to inadequate consideration of Māori cultural or spiritual 
precepts.145 For example, in one case, a court advises that:  
One needs to understand the culture of the Whanganui River iwi [tribe]146 
to realise how deeply ingrained the saying ko au te awa, ko te awa, ko au 
[I am the River, the River is me] is to those who have connections to the 
river. Their spirituality is their ‘connectedness’ to the river. To take away 
part of the river . . . is to take away part of the iwi. To desecrate the water 
is to desecrate the iwi. To pollute the water is to pollute the people.147 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Māori increasingly protested colonial 
depredations.148 The 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act set up the Waitangi Tribunal 
to consider Māori claims, many over environmental resources, against the 
Crown.149 Hundreds of claims have been adjudicated, with remedies including 
property transfers, cash payouts, and formal apologies.150 
Tribunal investigations into resource claims include evidence of ancestral 
connections to the resources in question.151 Even so, the Waitangi Tribunal set 
debates and outcomes on the Crown’s rhetorical terms.152 While the government 
was amenable to giving Māori greater shares of or control over essential 
resources, it was loath to relinquish fee simple ownership of those resources–so 
Western notions of property rights would linger as a backdrop of subsequent 
negotiations.153 For example, a 1992 deed settlement on offshore fishing rights 
gave Māori a greater percentage of the annual quota, but extinguished any claims 
based on cultural or spiritual relationships with the sea.154 Whanganui 
community leader Gerrard Albert, who was lead negotiator for the Whanganui 
River agreements, explained that in these formal government proceedings, the 
Māori lacked the opportunity to “emote,” i.e., to express their spiritual 
connection to the land (and the violence that had been done to that connection) 
in a public forum.155 
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A 1999 finding by the Waitangi Tribunal set the stage for a creative reso-
lution to the local Māori iwi’s claims over the Whanganui River.156 The Tribunal 
cites a long string of court cases over the River from 1938 to 1962, in “one of 
longest running items of litigation in New Zealand history.”157 The Tribunal goes 
into extensive detail on the ties between Māori and the River, which lend legiti-
macy to Māori demands that their relationship to the River be reflected in any 
remedies the Tribunal suggests.158 The Tribunal found that the “case is unique 
for the close physical and spiritual association of the people to the River and the 
history of their assertion of River ownership.”159 The Tribunal notes that the: 
[E]motive bond cannot be described solely in terms of a sentimental regard 
for the landforms of one’s country. Even the centrality of the River to the 
people’s lives is insufficient to explain how they think of it. It is tied as 
well to the Polynesian comprehension of the environment, where a River 
can be described as a tupuna or matua as with a caring parent. This points 
beyond personification to fundamental beliefs.160 
The Tribunal notes that: 
[F]or nearly a millennium the Atihaunui hapu161 have held the Whanganui 
River. They were known as the River people . . . The River was central to 
Atihaunui lives, their source of food, their single highway, their spiritual 
mentor. It was the aortic artery of Atihaunui heart, shrouded in history and 
tradition, the River remains symbolic of Atihaunui identity. It is the focal 
point for the Atihaunui people, whether there or away.162 
This cultural, spiritual connection to the River was central to legitimating the 
Māori’s legal claims to speak for the River.163 
Even without this longstanding and current bond between community and 
River, the Tribunal found that local Māori owned the River when the British 
colonized, and that the 1903 law that vested the riverbed in the Crown was done 
without their consent.164 Noting that the Māori’s:  
[P]articular concern today is that they are obliged to appear as supplicants 
before a number of authorities that control the river’s use, when, in terms 
of the Treaty, they own the river and the authorities should be making sup-
plications to them. It is something that adds considerable salt to the wound 
of wrongful deprivation, and it is something to be brought into account in 
any plan for remedial action.165 
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While the Māori negotiators would later abjure the notion that the River may be 
common “property” at all, the Tribunal clearly contemplates and validates a non-
Western notion of property, as “we are dealing not with the private property of 
individuals but with the common property of a people.”166 The Tribunal does not 
dictate a final legal resolution; it concludes that “resolution of a river treaty be-
tween Atihaunui and the Crown will require more particular guidelines. Negoti-
ating these guidelines will make the highest calls of statesmanship on both 
sides.”167 
 And so, it eventually would.168 
4. Negotiation Background and the Te Awa Tupua Act 
According to Gerrard Albert, while the Tribunal results were favorable to 
Māori claims, the formal proceedings were nonetheless “dressing us up in the 
same clothes we’re trying to break down.”169 Mr. Albert notes that the Māori 
eventually decided they “can’t work within the hegemony that has been recre-
ated.”170 He said that they knew they had to be “strategic,” “technical,” and “fas-
tidious,” and they sought from the River what the strategy should be.171 They 
decided to root their negotiation strategy with the government in the traditional 
Māori relationship with the River, “and lead them to our house.”172 
In 2010, the government concluded an agreement with the Tainui iwi over 
the Waikato River on the North Island.173 The agreement acknowledges (in Eng-
lish and Māori languages174) the tribe’s spiritual connection to the River,175 
acknowledges grave historical wrongdoings, including ecological degradation by 
the Crown,176 and sets up a government/Māori co-management Waikato River 
Authority.177 In other words, the agreement has most of the ingredients we will 
come to see below, except it does not provide legal personality for the Waikato 
River.178 
Christopher Finlayson, who was Attorney General, Minister for Treaty of 
Waitangi Negotiations for both Te Urewera and the Whanganui River, stressed 
that in neither negotiation did he view either side as “compromising”—rather, 
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they negotiated cordially, with a resulting mutually agreeable legal outcome.179 
For the Whanganui River negotiations, conviviality played a role: the local iwi 
invited the newly elected Conservative Party Prime Minister John Key along 
with Mr. Finlayson to social events where both sides got to know and trust each 
other.180 When Mr. Finlayson was appointed Crown negotiator, he asked Gerrard 
Albert for an “outline” of what the iwi wanted; that served as the basis for the 
negotiations.181 For Mr. Finlayson, the negotiations were guided not by what the 
words in the original Treaty of Waitangi did or did not mean, or even what Māori 
cosmology connoted (although he respects the cosmology).182 It was simply 
about social justice: given how the Māori had been treated, they deserved a fair 
resolution, and they deserved it on their own terms.183 He also had the full sup-
port of the Prime Minister and Finance Minister to conduct these negotiations; 
they also supported the final, novel legal forms that emerged.184 The Whanganui 
negotiations were also guided by Te Urewera’s positive results and innovative 
legal outcomes.185 According to Mr. Finlayson, neither side wanted a “co-gov-
ernance” model, and it made no sense to either side to grant the Māori property 
rights to the riverbed while keeping the air above the River in Crown hands.186 
So the stage was set: the government opposed Māori (or anyone’s) owner-
ship of freshwater (while somehow believing that rights to use the water may be 
bought and sold).187 And while the Māori don’t believe in private property own-
ership of Rivers or land, they had been forced into the position that they do be-
lieve in such, i.e., if anyone is going to “own” these resources, it should be them 
based upon ancestral claims (they were here first, after all), and treaty obliga-
tions.188 Anne Salmond has posited that the Māori must thus posit “simultaneous 
relevance of alternative realities,” speaking modern legalese interwoven with 
Māori language and cosmology.189 Previous Māori agreements resulting in trans-
fer of property rights amounted to what she has called “ontological submis-
sion:”190 the local iwi may gain the rights to control and use and/or own the re-
source, but at the expense of violating the deep-rooted understanding of their 
relationship with the world around them, and undermining their own claims 
founded in a non-Western paradigm of non-property.191 Salmond cites one Māori 
claimant at a Waitangi Tribunal hearing on freshwater saying that while his peo-
ple did not believe anyone could own water, and “they had been comfortable 
with the Crown managing their rivers for the good of the nation, they did not 
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agree that these waterways should be handed over to partially privatized power 
companies.”192 Thus, they had little choice: “Blame the Government for us 
claiming ownership.”193 
For the Whanganui negotiations, Gerrard Albert said the iwi “[d]idn’t want 
to change the dance—we wanted to change the music so people would dance a 
different way: what instrument can we play to change the music?”194 As a way 
forward, the community’s attorneys suggested the idea of “legal personhood” for 
the River with some kind of Māori board to speak for how to fulfill the goals of 
the River on an ongoing basis.195 
5. Te Awa Tupua 
The result is Te Awa Tupua (meaning literally “River with Ancestral 
Power”),196 i.e., the Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act of 2017.197 It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to analyze detailed, specific elements of Māori 
cosmology that underlie and legitimate the resulting agreement. The Whanganui 
River has, for centuries, flowed at the center of the iwi’s existence; it provided 
quotidian needs (water, food), and lies at the heart of their cosmology.198 Māori 
have traditionally believed that environmental features have life forces imbued 
in spirits; humans are protected by these spirits, and, in turn, must revere and 
maintain the ecological resources associated with these spirits.199 For example, 
Anne Salmond describes  “hau,” as a “wind of life” that emerged at the beginning 
of time and animates those who share all gifts.200 When the Māori say, “I am the 
River, and the River is me,” that is because Māori do and always have shared 
hau with the River, which they view as a living being that offers gifts of suste-
nance, which in turn are received and returned through caring stewardship of the 
River.201 
Whatever it ends up meaning for actual impact on the mountain or the 
River, these new legal frameworks are revolutionary in establishing in law the 
biocultural rights of the people who have long lived in close interrelation with 
the nonhuman world.202 
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O’Donnell & MacPherson write: “Finding the right balance between legal 
rights that increase the power of the river to protect itself, and maintaining com-
munity support for management of a public resource is difficult.”203 Difficult or 
not, it is precisely the potential beauty of the new arrangement. The legal form 
comes from the community and devolves power to the community. By design, 
the legal agreements the Māori sought in Te Urewera and Whanganui not only 
mirror cultural precepts, but reinforce those precepts. At the core of the Māori 
position in both negotiations was that they did not want anyone to “own” the 
national park lands or the River, as this would violate their “tikanga,” or custom-
ary law.204 The Mountain and River and their ecosystems own themselves. The 
Māori wanted recognition of that core legal fact, and they wanted to be in control 
of how humans treated the Mountain and the River.205 That is to say, they wanted 
to be the ones to translate what the Mountain and River—and thus the interwoven 
human communities—need and want.206 
Gerrard Albert points out that they explicitly set out to devise a different 
legal form that more accurately reflects and frames the worldview they hold, one 
that replaces hierarchy with relationship, dominance with interdependence, and 
property rights with interconnected management responsibilities.207 Mr. Albert 
thus sought a legal agreement that would reinforce the fundamental interrelated-
ness and help fulfill his iwi’s connection and commitment to the nonhuman an-
cestors.208 Thus, in 2008, after negotiations with the Crown had broken down 
over the legal status of the Whanganui and the associated iwi, Mr. Albert and his 
peers realized they had a chance to seek what they truly wanted.209 The iwi saw 
three different ancestors as controlling, or guiding, the three parts of the Whan-
ganui.210 As long as the primacy of these ancestors, and the iwi’s relationships 
with them, were recognized, the iwi did not require or desire fee simple owner-
ship of the River.211 As noted above, such ownership violated their worldview, 
anyway: they could not “own” that to which they fundamentally belonged.212 
As Mr. Albert put it, to pursue and accept formal legal ownership is to “fall 
into a trap” because “ownership does not provide for the totality of the relation-
ship.”213 Mr. Albert said they recognized that “when we argue within their con-
structs we keep getting narrowed so we don’t recognize the results.”214 
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6. The Statutory Governance Agreement 
Te Awa Tupua–the Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act of 2017–cod-
ifies legal personhood for the Whanganui River and honors in the law their rela-
tionship to the River.215 The deed of settlement starts by formalizing a Govern-
ment apology to the Māori.216 The Act establishes that the River “is an indivisible 
and living whole, comprising the Whanganui River from the mountains to the 
sea, incorporating all its physical and metaphysical elements.”217 The Act recog-
nizes “Tupua te Kawa,” or  the “intrinsic values that represent the essence of Te 
Awa Tupua,” including that the River is a “spiritual and physical entity that sup-
ports and sustains both the life and natural resources within the Whanganui River 
and the health and well-being of the iwi, hapū, and other communities of the 
River,” and that “[t]he iwi and hapū of the Whanganui River have an inalienable 
connection with, and responsibility to, Te Awa Tupua and its health and well-
being.”218 
In the most widely cited section, the Act declares “Te Awa Tupua is a legal 
person and has all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person.”219 
The Act creates “Te Pou Tupua,” i.e., “the human face of Te Awa Tupua”220 
whose duties are “to act and speak for and on behalf of Te Awa Tupua” and “to 
promote and protect the health and well-being of Te Awa Tupua.”221 
The new legal form does not sweep away existing property law or power 
structures in one blow. The Act stipulates that nothing in the Act “creates, limits, 
transfers, extinguishes, or otherwise affects any rights to, or interests in,” water 
nor extinguishes existing private property rights.222 Thus, even though the River 
is a legal person, it does not own itself. Furthermore, the Act does not extinguish 
“existing rights of State-owned enterprises,” which will give Te Awa Tupua 
problems when speaking for the River while negotiating with utilities and other 
related entities.223 
To fulfill its duties, Te Pou Tupua “must act in the interests of Te Awa 
Tupua and consistently with Tupua te Kawa,”224 i.e., with “the intrinsic values 
that represent the essence of Te Awa Tupua . . . .”225 Te Pou Tupua is authorized 
to report publicly on behalf of the River, “may engage with any relevant agency, 
other body, or decision maker to assist it to understand, apply, and implement 
the Te Awa Tupua status and the Tupua te Kawa,” and “may participate in any 
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statutory process affecting Te Awa Tupua in which Te Pou Tupua would be en-
titled to participate under any legislation.”226 
The Crown and Māori agreed that there would be two political appointees, 
one selected by the Government, and the other “by the iwi with interests in the 
Whanganui River.”227 As Gerrard Albert stressed to me, they are not “guardians” 
of the River, as the deal is sometimes portrayed.228 Not only does the word 
“guardian” not appear in the statute, but according to Mr. Albert, it would turn 
reality on its head to suggest that humans are “guardians” of the River; if any-
thing, the reverse would be true.229 Instead, they are political appointees on 
which both Government and Iwi agree.230 Both initial appointees are Māori; the 
first Crown representative is not only Māori, but was former head of the Māori 
political party and a Minister in the Conservative government that developed the 
settlement, appointed, by the government, according to Mr. Finlayson, for her 
“strength and wisdom.”231 This further speaks to the government’s commitment 
to respecting the new arrangement.  
7. What Lies Ahead?  
The legislation also sets up three additional entities, advisory and strategy 
groups comprised of various River stakeholders.232 The structure is a bit convo-
luted: how the four governance entities will interact and carve up the administra-
tive territory remains to be seen.  
It is also too early to see what will happen when development potentially 
affects the Whanganui. But Gerrard Albert told me it’s important to be clear that 
this legislation means what it says, i.e., the River now has a human voice, and 
that voice must be consulted and respected when authorizing any development 
that might impact the River.233 Mr. Albert told me the Te Awa Tupua represent-
atives are now figuring out the structure for how they will fulfill their commit-
ments: “We have an obligation to this River for what it is.”234 As such, Te Awa 
Tupua has started defining what the values of the River are that will be expressed 
when the governing board inserts itself in decisions about the Whanganui: “We 
are part of the picture and it’s our job to take care of it and have it provide us 
what we need.”235 They are socializing all members of the community for what 
they should expect and how they can participate;236 of those who would take 
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actions that might harm the River (and thus harm the iwi) for what the Te Awa 
Tupua agreements mean legally;237 and of the government for what the iwi ex-
pect of them to uphold their commitments.238 
The first, small tests of Te Awa Tupua are occurring as of this writing, on 
removals of power lines and construction of a cycling bridge.239 In negotiating 
over these, Te Awa Tupua is “reconditioning a community and nation to speak 
as we speak.”240 They wish to confront any problems through negotiation, keep-
ing Te Awa Tupua out of the courts both as a preferred means of conflict resolu-
tion, but also until judges can be properly socialized on what it means, legally, 
for Te Awa Tupua to speak for the River.241 
As both Gerrard Albert and Chris Finlayson hinted to me, these early inter-
ventions are muscle flexing  to show seriousness and strength.242 Looming over 
ongoing work is the Tongariro Power Scheme, which diverts 80% of the Whan-
ganui River.243 This has been described as an “act of aquatic decapitation” of the 
headwaters of the River.244 A National Geographic article quotes a Māori River 
guide: “‘I have seen grown men cry over this sight.’”245 In twenty years’ time, 
the Scheme will be up for relicensing: the legal power of Te Awa Tupua as the 
voice of the Whanganui will be powerfully tested, and Mr. Albert says the inter-
vening years will be about building the capacity–of the community, of the gov-
ernment, of the ecosystem – to meet that challenge.246 
8. Te Urewera 
Te Urewera, in the east of New Zealand’s North Island, comprises 820 
square miles of mountain, rivers, lakes, and forests composed of prehistoric tree 
ferns and other endemic species.247 When it was still a National Park, I back-
packed one of New Zealand’s “Great Walks” around Lake Waikaremoana, in the 
heart of Te Urewera; I can attest it is a land of spectacular natural beauty. 
For the negotiations that would result in legal personhood for Te Urewera, 
it helped the Tūhoe (the local iwi) cause that the National Park was “pepperpot-
ted” with official Māori land holdings, i.e., Mãori owned land in a traditional 
Western sense, which they had not ceded to the Crown.248 Through the process, 
the Tūhoe vetted their proposal with key interest groups, and, according to Mr. 
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Finlayson, were “consummate negotiators” in achieving the legal outcome they 
sought.249 The government was not willing to turn over ownership of the Na-
tional Park to the Tūhoe, and rejected a proposal to formally and symbolically 
recognize the National Park land as the Tūhoe ancestor.250 The Tūhoe deemed 
formal, continued Crown ownership as unacceptable, and to accept ownership 
would undermine the Māori concept of what can and cannot be owned in the first 
place.251 This negotiation stalemate created space for a happy compromise: legal 
personality for the former park—it owns itself—with public access maintained 
and governance according to a set of principles that reflect Tūhoe cosmology.252 
The Te Urewera Act begins by noting that “Te Urewera is ancient and en-
during, a fortress of nature, alive with history . . . a place of spiritual value, with 
its own mana [status, prestige] and mauri [life force] . . . has an identity in and 
of itself, inspiring people to commit to its care.”253 The Act declares that “Te 
Urewera is a legal entity, and has all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of 
a legal person.”254 The Act transfers the National Park (formerly the largest on 
the North Island) to the Te Urewera Board who will speak for the land, comprised 
of both Tūhoe and government appointees, with the balance gradually shifting 
over time to prioritize Māori members.255 The Board’s first duty is to derive a 
management plan.256 The Act specifies that the Board will manage according to 
traditional Tūhoe principles such as “mana me mauri,” i.e., “the sensitive per-
ception of a living and spiritual force in a place,” and “tapu,” i.e., “a state or 
condition that requires certain respectful human conduct, including raising 
awareness or knowledge of the spiritual qualities requiring respect.”257 
9. Governance Document for Te Urewera 
Te Urewera’s Governing Board, which will speak for the mountain and its 
ecosystem, has presented its vision, “Te Kawa.”258 The Chairman of the Board, 
Tāmati Kruger (who was also the chief negotiator for the Tūhoe Māori) writes 
that Te Kawa is aimed to “disrupt the norm,” as it is “about the management of 
people for the benefit of the land–it is not about land management.”259 The nuts 
and bolts of how the vision will be implemented are not found in Te Kawa, as 
“[n]ew standards and expectations will take time to grow” and “will involve a 
process of unlearning, rediscovery, and relearning to seize the truth expressed by 
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our beliefs.”260 That is to say, no one has ever had to use a Western legal system 
to manage a former National Park that now has acquired legal personhood and 
requires a culturally appropriate mouthpiece to speak for its desires.261 
Analogous to a framework convention in international law, Te Kawa 
clearly expresses the values that will drive Te Urewera governance, “to start the 
journey of understanding and articulating the Te Urewera identity.”262 The spe-
cific protocols will follow in due course. All the New Zealanders with whom I 
spoke, Māori and Pākehā,263 stressed that these core principles would be recog-
nizable to all Māori, and not just the Tūhoe iwi.264 The document asserts: “If Te 
Kawa has a true purpose it is one that hopes to draw people closer to Te Urewera; 
to respecting the role that people play in achieving nature’s balance if we have a 
wish for a secure future; and to encourage progress that inspires sustainable and 
disciplined prosperity.”265 Seven principles will bring “moral integrity” and thus 
guide management: for example, “Papatūānuku” or “landscape,” i.e., “nature it-
self operates on the basis of diversity. A human view of devastation can be for 
Te Urewera a process of recycling and regeneration.266 Nothing in nature is 
wasted, everything happens for a reason.267 Te Urewera has a scale beyond our 
perception in which to balance and order life.”268 The document lays out non-
specific “responsibilities” for the Board to follow, with non-specific “priorities” 
that will help fulfill the responsibilities.269 For example, for Papatūānuku, a re-
sponsibility is “rebuilding traditional and innovative knowledge systems which 
restores our instinct for responsible living.”270 
In a section entitled “The Legal Personality Applied,” the Board explains 
that the Te Urewera Act recognizes that “Te Urewera has its own identity, in and 
of itself, inspiring people to commit to its care.”271 This identity existed before 
any statute proclaimed it;272 the statute merely “liberates it from human specula-
tion in order that nature and the natural world return to its primal role, revered 
and served by those of her children she has given life to.”273 The Board gives its 
view on the kind of property rights that normally adjudicate human/nature rela-
tions: property rights have rendered nature’s “parts as natural resources now ca-
pable of competing with other household choices” and fail to “give life nor do 
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they encourage the connectedness of all living things . . . .”274 While the former 
National Park “was sympathetic to the voice of Te Urewera,” the legal form was 
nonetheless guilty of “ignoring the presence and personality of Te Urewera, 
treating her as lands for the enjoyment of others . . . .”275 The document invites 
a continued relationship with “Friends”—i.e. the government agencies with 
whom they will need to continue to collaborate.276 
It’s still early to see how legal personhood for Te Urewera will translate 
into tangible management decisions, or how the Board will put their values into 
practice. Humans could potentially exploit the area more, not less, than when the 
lands were protected under National Park law; hunting, for example, could be 
allowed, where it was prohibited before.277 Te Kawa invites new business op-
portunities or leases—“friendship agreements”—which must, in their applica-
tion, “demonstrate loyal affection to Te Urewera values and her need to continue 
her complex balancing act among living system[s].”278 
The 2019–2020 Annual Plan portends a “daunting yet thrilling year.”279 
The Board hints quite broadly that it is going to work at its own pace, not the 
pace the external world might wish to see: “The priority is ensuring our enduring 
principles are applied to the journey of revitalization—not compromising them 
in order to achieve one-dimensional outcomes as quickly as possible.”280 The 
named plans combine the spiritual with the pragmatic, e.g. “[e]xperiences with 
the moods, mystery[,] and serenity of Te Urewera are gathered to inform the 
redesign of the Waikaremoana Great Walk.”281 Or, more pragmatically and om-
inously for future negotiations over hydroelectric power, “[s]ettle an improved 
relationship with Genesis Energy to deliver improved responsibility at Lake Wai-
karemoana.”282 
As a forerunner of possible management activities (and potential conflicts) 
to come, the 2019-2020 plan continues stage two of “Nature’s Road [T]rial.”283 
To reseal a road that runs through Te Urewera, the Tūhoe are rejecting oil-based 
asphalt in favor of an ecologically sustainable surface composed of tree resin.284 
Regional development officials are complaining that foot-dragging means losing 
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the funding to seal the road, and grumble that the environmentally friendly option 
is, nonetheless, “hillbilly thinking.”285 The Tūhoe counter that they reject the 
“rape and pillage mentality . . . of unchecked tourism,” and plan to proceed with 
road construction that reflects the values expressed in Te Kawa.286 Also in Te 
Urewera, a storm damaged footbridge around Lake Waikeremoana that forms 
part of one of the “Great Walks” has been out of commission for months due to 
delays from the Te Urewera Tūhoe governing body: according to Chairman Kru-
ger, “[w]e are wanting engineers to come in because the issue could very well be 
that the bridge is in the wrong place.”287 Thus in these early skirmishes, the 
Tūhoe representatives are indicating that they plan to use their new legal powers 
to govern Te Urewera according to traditional precepts, but merging traditional 
values with Western law in a new biocultural governance paradigm will take 
slow and deliberate implementation.288 
10. Implications of Legal Personhood in New Zealand 
Cormac Cullinan writes that: 
[E]ven if the law were to acknowledge that, say, a River had the capacity 
to hold rights, extending the language of rights and duties to relations with 
nonhuman subjects is potentially confusing. Terms such as ‘rights’ and 
‘duties’ are infused with our experience of existing legal systems and bur-
dened with the connotations of conflicts.289 
In both Te Urewera and Whanganui, newly legally empowered Māori groups are 
deciding what it means for nonhuman entities to have legal rights, and the gov-
ernment is cooperating with their efforts. Ian Hicks, Negotiation and Settlement 
Manager for the Office of Māori-Crown relations, told me that in 2018, his office 
adopted this new name of “Te Arawhiti,” which translates to “The Bridge.”290 
The officers are actively figuring out what this means: what do they want to be 
and say in 2040, when the Tongariro Power Scheme is being negotiated? As Mr. 
Hicks puts it, “Māori have been coming across the bridge to come into the Pākehā 
world . . . [n]ow we are crossing back to work into the Māori world.”291 In New 
Zealand, this partnership between government and Māori is attempting to lighten 
the burden of preexisting expectations—of sociolegal and socioecological sys-
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tems—by bending the existing, entrenched legal system to forge a new jurispru-
dence based upon an ontological view of the world that the entrenched legal sys-
tem does not traditionally recognize, reflect, or revere.292 
Hundreds of other settlements have resulted from the Waitangi Tribunal 
negotiations, and legally cannot be reopened to attempt to incorporate new, hy-
brid legal constructions.293 Mt. Taranaki, on the North Island, has also been 
granted legal personhood, with details on governance still to be settled.294 That 
agreement, too, starts with a recitation (in both Māori and English) of the cultural 
and ecological connections between iwi and mountain: “The maunga [moun-
tains] are pou [fixed elements] that form a connection between the physical and 
the social elements of our lived experience . . . . Their presence pervades our 
scenery, projecting mystery, adventure and beauty, capturing our attention and 
our imagination in how humanity can be closely bound to a landscape.”295 The 
agreement includes a formal apology from the government,296 and, while the area 
will remain a national park, the parties pledge to formally change the name from 
Mt. Egmont to an appropriate Māori appellation.297 
Broader questions may remain to be discussed in Māori-government nego-
tiations. The most pressing is who controls water—in riverbeds, in the fore-
shore—and under what legal forms.298 Not all Kiwis approve of the ongoing de-
volution of property, and ideas about property, to the Māori.299 In an editorial in 
New Zealand’s main newspaper entitled Tribunal Enraptured by Myths and Leg-
ends, far-right politician and former MP Rodney Hide300 comments on the Wai-
tangi Tribunal’s finding that the Māori actually possess the nation’s water-
ways.301 He writes: “Who would have believed it? Singing a song can make a 
river yours. Plus give you a chunk of a power company and a say over how that 
company[] [is] run . . . . It’s not quite enough to just sing a song. You should also 
know the river’s taniwha302 and use the river to wash away spells and curses. But 
the clincher is to recognise the river’s life force. Then it’s yours.”303 To put things 
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with less snark, no party to the agreement locks the Māori into an ancient, un-
changing worldview.304 Their communities, too, will have to balance respecting 
what the river needs, and what their communities need in terms of economic 
development. Rivers may not receive quite the comprehensive protections that 
some environmentalists desire.305 
But the laws granting the Whanganui and Te Urewera legal personhood, 
negotiated by a Conservative government, passed nearly unanimously, and all 
the key players with whom I spoke assert that these agreements have broad sup-
port of most Kiwis across political affiliations.306 Whether that consensus re-
mains when Māori start employing their new legal powers remains to be seen. 
These agreements lend themselves to a broader understanding of how all New 
Zealanders relate to, and thus manage the nonhuman world around them. The 
new legal models create a new vision for how law can reflect ecological reality, 
which the law usually ignores, at our own peril.  
How these elisions between old and new are understood and negotiated in 
this century will matter in deciding who has what rights to determine relation-
ships between a local people and the river, or the mountain, or any other nonhu-
man entity. By negotiating legal personhood for Te Urewera, Whanganui River, 
or Mt. Taranaki, government and community have come to a consensus that may 
be revolutionary. In part, this is due to the new approach to rights for the nonhu-
man world, but more importantly as a way for the colonizers to atone for past 
and even present injustice through reformulating the colonizer’s tools—Western 
law—to reflect and honor the cosmology of the colonized.307 The approach to 
protecting nature means not keeping it apart from people, but recognizing the 
interconnected web of relationships between human and nonhuman.308 People 
may still use resources from the mountain or river, provided they do so gratefully 
and sustainably;309 these agreements name our responsibility to sustain nature, 
which, in turn, will sustain us. The paradigm has shifted from our right to use a 
dissociated nature to responsibility to steward a nature of which we are a part.  
While the New Zealand agreements here are sometimes portrayed as “rights 
for nature,” that is not precisely correct.310 Clearly the Māori and the agreements 
they have fomented reify that nature has intrinsic value.311 But what is written 
into these agreements is the primacy of the relationship between human and non-
human communities, a legal recognition of the value of this complex relation-
ship, and recognition that the health of both human and nonhuman improving in 
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synergistic, symbiotic interconnection.312 What is happening in New Zealand is 
a discussion over representation and relationship: relationships between Pākeha 
and Māori, between Te Ao Māori and Te Ao Pākeha (the Māori and Western 
worldviews), between colonizer and colonized, between people and the nonhu-
man world, between citizens and mountains and rivers.313 Ownership qua own-
ership may be less powerful than results of negotiations for who gets to speak for 
the River, and thus whose paradigm of human/nonhuman relations is deemed 
legitimate—culturally, legally—and thus controlling. Legal personhood for the 
Whanganui or Te Urewera is simply the latest, perhaps most important chapter 
in the Māori quest for self-determination, here the ability of a people to determine 
their relationships to the nonhuman world around them.314 
It remains to be seen how these new legal forms do or do not transform the 
nonhuman entities, the human communities that share the planet with them, and 
the relationships between human and nonhuman communities. Much will ride on 
the institutions and people in charge of those institutions that emerge to speak 
for the needs of the river, the mountain, and the communities that are the river 
and the mountain. 
In some ways, the grants of legal personhood to Te Urewera and the Whan-
ganui River result from a fortunate, sui generis combination of factors: a formal 
treaty whose inaccurate translations and government violations have been 
acknowledged by all sides;315 a clearly documented history of cultural relation-
ships to the nonhuman world that dovetail with modern understandings of eco-
logical interdependence;316 a government’s decades-old commitment to com-
pensate for past wrongs, including novel remedies that go beyond mere financial 
compensation or exchanges of property rights;317 a savvy succession of indige-
nous negotiators who know what they want and know how to get it.318 It would 
be easy to isolate the resulting legal innovations as incapable of repetition else-
where. And, of course, no situation is going to replicate the current and present 
logistics of New Zealand.319 
But these legal outcomes are replicable, mutatis mutandis, anywhere citi-
zens are looking to legalize a complicated, ecologically grounded recognition 
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that we are fundamentally interconnected with the natural world—that we are the 
natural world and it is us.320 The underlying beliefs may have deep historical 
roots, as in Māori New Zealand, or they may be thoroughly modern inventions 
prompted by the cataclysms portended by ecological scientists or by ecological 
degradation we view through our own eyes in our own neighborhoods.321 Seeing 
ourselves as part of, not apart from nonhuman nature means we see that we injure 
ourselves with each species loss or chemical catastrophe.322 By reorienting how 
we understand our interrelationship with the natural world, and writing that re-
orientation into law, we ward against injuring the natural world, and thus our-
selves.323 
B. Colombia 
In November 2016, in a case brought by a Colombian NGO324 on behalf of 
isolated, minority communities, a three-judge panel of the Colombian Constitu-
tional Court declared that the Río Atrato’s “basin and tributaries are recognized 
as an entity subject to rights of protection, conservation, maintenance and resto-
ration by the State and ethnic communities.”325 
The Court reached this remedy through a sweeping analysis of the “biocul-
tural” connection between rural, minority communities, and the River upon 
which they depend culturally, and, more importantly for this decision, ecologi-
cally.326 The decision then presents one of the most extensive analyses a court 
has ever undertaken of the essential links between nature and culture, or the in-
terdependence between human communities and the nonhuman entities and pro-
cesses that sustain them.327 The decision then pivots to analyze an “ecocentric” 
shift in philosophy, and roots the legal innovation of granting the Río legal rights 
in that philosophical turn.328 
The Río Atrato, the largest River in Colombia, runs through the Chocó, 
described by the Court as: 
[O]ne of the most biodiverse regions of the planet. . . . [I]t must be remem-
bered that Colombia has been recognized by the international community 
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as a ‘mega-biodiverse’ country, as it constitutes a source of invaluable nat-
ural wealth on the planet; which merits special protection under universal 
co-responsibility.329 
In addition to “this historical situation of poverty, marginalization, institutional 
isolation and the accumulation of a large number of unsatisfied basic needs—in 
a region of the country that has been historically affected by violence, displace-
ment and internal armed conflict,” the Court documents in detail that logging 
and, especially, gold and platinum mining (legal and illegal) are poisoning (mer-
cury, cyanide) the River’s human neighbors and threatening their traditional 
means of subsistence.330 The Court describes deaths and illnesses (e.g. dengue, 
diarrhea) from contaminated water, which also damages “the fish and the devel-
opment of agriculture that are indispensable and essential elements of food in the 
region, which is the place where the communities have built their territory, and 
their culture.”331 The Court “denounce[s] the complete abandonment of the re-
gion by the Colombian State, in terms of basic infrastructure, which does not 
include an aqueduct, sewerage or final waste disposal systems.”332 
Given the disastrous state of the environment and the degraded state of the 
ethnic populations whose lives and livelihoods depend on that environment, the 
Court reaches for a more sweeping solution than hitherto ineffective laws, gov-
ernment (in)actions, and prior Court decisions have yielded.333 The Court is 
aware of these impacts not merely from documented submissions, but because 
the judges visited the impacted sites and saw the damages themselves.334 From 
their inspections, they conclude that the “impact of illegal mining on the river is 
so strong that today it is practically impossible to determine the original channel 
that river once had, its arms and its tributaries.”335 Linked to the ecological deg-
radation, “the impact of illegal mining is so strong that, as the Plaintiffs have 
pointed out, it has managed to separate families, increase violence and encourage 
the loss of the ancestral beliefs and traditions of the black communities that in-
habit the Atrato River Basin in Chocó.”336 
Parallel to the core rationale behind the New Zealand grants of legal per-
sonhood to nonhuman entities, the Court here draws extensive connections be-
tween the health of human communities and the health of the river.337 The Court 
does take special solicitude of the indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities 
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that live along the Río Atrato’s banks, nearly half of whom live in “extreme pov-
erty.”338 The Court describes the communities’ longstanding ties to and depend-
ence on the River, which they’ve relied upon for “a total supply of their food 
needs . . . . The communities have made the Atrato River Basin not only their 
territory, but the space to reproduce life and recreate culture.”339 The River is not 
merely their source of sustenance; the Court describes a deeply rooted connec-
tion of community “since ancestral times”340 to the River:  
The settlements make the river a central space in all the economic, domes-
tic and socio-cultural activities of the local inhabitants. . . . The origin of 
each person is indicated by the river from which one lives. More than re-
ferring to a town or village, what is mentioned is the river. In effect, there 
is a close and intimate relationship between the individual and the river, 
which is observed in expressions such as ‘he does not like to leave his river’ 
or ‘when I return to my river.’ In this configuration the river represents a 
notion of home, a strong feeling of belonging full of symbolic, territorial 
and cultural values.341 
The Court notes that these groups have a notion of the River-as-community that 
diverges from the Western model of River-as-property: “for the ethnic commu-
nities, the territory does not fall on a single individual—as it is understood in the 
classical conception of private law—but above all the human group that inhabits 
it, so that it acquires an eminently collective character.”342 
In our interview, Chief Justice Palacio emphasized the need to protect fun-
damental rights abridged by unregulated mining and logging: “There, what is 
being protected are these fundamental rights: the right to life, the right to health, 
the right to potable water, the right to a healthy environment, the right to culture, 
and the right to territory. It has died, died.”343 The decision (and our interview) 
emphasized the Colombian concept of a “Social Rule of Law,” [SRL] which re-
quires ecological health as a primary component.344 The 1991 revisions to Co-
lombia’s Constitution have also produced an “Ecological Constitution,” where 
“protection of rivers, forests, food sources, the environment and biodiversity, as 
they are part of the nation’s natural and cultural wealth, make full sense.”345 The 
Ecological Constitution includes about 30 provisions (with judicial decisions ex-
pansively interpreting those provisions) emphasizing the core role of a healthy 
environment for a healthy human populace: by allowing citizens “to live and 
interact within a healthy environment unthreatened by the extractive activity of 
the state, which allows him to develop his existence in decent conditions . . . . In 
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simpler words: the defense of the environment is . . . a primary objective within 
the structure of our SRL . . . .”346 
The Court provides an extensive, erudite analysis of the interdependence 
between cultural diversity and biological diversity.347 The decision describes “bi-
ocultural rights,” i.e.: 
[T]he rights that ethnic communities have to administer and exercise au-
tonomous guardianship over their territories—according to their own laws 
and customs—and the natural resources that make up their habitat, where 
their culture, their traditions and their way of life are developed based on 
the special relationship they have with the environment and biodiversity.348 
The Court stresses “the deep and intrinsic connection that exists between nature, 
its resources, and the culture of the ethnic and indigenous communities that in-
habit them, which are interdependent with each other and cannot be understood 
in isolation.”349 Without delving extensively into these communities’ specific 
cosmologies, the Court emphasizes the general “spiritual and cultural meanings 
that indigenous peoples and local communities give to nature are an integral part 
of biocultural diversity,” and thus “the conservation of cultural diversity leads to 
the conservation of biological diversity, so that the design of policy, legislation 
and jurisprudence must be focused on the conservation of bioculturalism.”350 
As in the New Zealand agreements, the Colombian Court is concerned 
about the natural world because preservation of local, indigenous cultures de-
pends upon it.351 Unlike the New Zealand legal developments, however, the 
judges of the Colombian Constitutional Court seem particularly influenced by 
ecocentric philosophy and thus are also concerned with preservation of biodiver-
sity for its own sake, urging that law focus “on the preservation of conditions 
needed for biodiversity to continue deploying its evolutionary potential in a sta-
ble and indefinite manner . . . .”352 The Court thus protects: 
[O]ther living organisms with whom the planet is shared, which are under-
stood to be worthy of protection in themselves. It is about being aware of 
the interdependence that connects us to all living beings on earth; that is, 
recognizing ourselves as integral parts of the global ecosystem—the bio-
sphere, rather than from normative categories of domination, simple ex-
ploitation, or utility.353 
Chief Justice Palacio explained to me that his readings in ecocentrism particu-
larly influenced him: “[i]t says that the human species is just another species on 
planet earth like our brothers the trees, like our brother the lion, like our sisters 
the beautiful flowers . . . .”354 
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This philosophical turn to ecocentrism, combined with appreciation and 
concern for local populations who, by this Court’s reckoning, have traditionally 
shared this philosophical bent, buttresses the Court’s turn to granting rights to 
the River itself and to the governance form that places control and authority in 
the hands of local people:  
[T]he ecocentric approach starts from a basic premise according to which 
the land does not belong to man and, on the contrary, assumes that man is 
part of the earth, like any other species. According to this interpretation, 
the human species is just one more event in a long evolutionary chain that 
has lasted for billions of years and therefore is not in any way the owner of 
other species, biodiversity, or resources, or the fate of the planet.355 
And the most logical voices to speak for the nonhuman are those who know 
it best and depend upon it most: “[c]onsequently, this theory conceives nature as 
a real subject of rights that must be recognized by the States and exercised under 
the protection of its legal representatives, such as, for example, [namely] by the 
communities that inhabit nature or that have a special relationship with it.”356 
Seeing nature “as a real subject of rights” also highlights the Court’s view 
that our normal, legal notions of nature are myopically utilitarian.357 The Court 
decries the view that nature is worth something only if it’s worth something to 
us: 
[T]he greatest challenge of contemporary constitutionalism in environmen-
tal matters is to achieve the safeguarding and effective protection of nature, 
the cultures and life forms associated with it, and biodiversity not by the 
simple material, genetic or productive utility that these may represent for 
the human being, but because being a living entity composed of other mul-
tiple forms of life and cultural representations, they are subjects of 
rights . . . .358 
Because of this, “only from an attitude of deep respect and humility with nature, 
its members and their culture, is it possible to enter into relationships with them 
in fair and equitable terms, leaving aside any concept that is limited to the simply 
utilitarian, economic or efficiency.”359 
The Court’s jurisprudence is not without precedent, as the Justices detail.360 
Previous landmark decisions, both in Colombian courts and the InterAmerican 
Court of Human Rights, stress the interdependence of cultural and ecological 
diversity, including advocacy for protection of ecosystems on which minority 
populations depend.361 Colombian cases have seen that “nature is not only con-
ceived as the environment that surrounds human beings, but also as a subject 
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with its own rights. . . . This is a position that has mainly found justification in 
the ancestral knowledge according to the principle of ethnic and cultural diver-
sity of the Nation.”362 In addition, 
instruments of international law that have been ratified by Colombia, as 
well as other non-binding additional instruments on the rights of the ethnic 
communities outlined here, have consolidated the development of a com-
prehensive approach that has helped to protect both the biological diversity 
and the cultural diversity of the nation, recognizing the deep interrelations 
of indigenous peoples, black and local communities with the territory and 
natural resources.363 
All of this leads the Court to conclude that “the importance of the biological and 
cultural diversity of the nation for the next generations and the survival of the 
planet, imposes on the States the need to adopt comprehensive public policies on 
conservation, preservation and compensation that reflect the interdependence be-
tween biological and cultural diversity.”364 
But even with all of the ground the Court prepared, the Justices did not need 
to jump to legal personhood for the Río Atrato.365 The Court orders various 
“emergency measures” for the (ir)responsible parties to clean up the River;366 it 
could have stopped there. Just because a Court recognizes biocultural relation-
ships and human/nonhuman interdependence does not mean it needs to grant 
rights to nature. Nonetheless, the Court clearly believes traditional remedies will 
not suffice: “[s]ince it is a structural problem, it requires the adoption of complex 
measures and an inter-institutional articulation that exceeds the normative and 
practical scope of the action in question . . . .”367 
The Court clearly sees itself as a staunch defender of the planet and the 
hapless humans destroying our own life support systems: “[n]ow is the time to 
begin taking the first steps to effectively protect the planet and its resources be-
fore it is too late, or the damage is irreversible, not only for future generations 
but for the human species.”368 It is time for humans (and our courts) to start “rec-
ognizing their role within the circle of life and evolution from an ecocentric per-
spective. . . . it is a matter of establishing a legal instrument that offers greater 
justice to nature and its relations with human beings . . . .”369 As such, the Court 
notes “at the international level . . . a new legal approach called biocultural rights 
is being developed, whose central premise is the relationship of profound unity 
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and interdependence between nature and human species, and that has as a con-
sequence a new socio-legal understanding in which nature should be taken seri-
ously and with full rights. That is, as a subject of rights.”370 
The need for a radical, new ethic of human/nonhuman relations leads the 
Court to a radical, new legal form: 
[J]ustice for nature must be applied beyond the human scenario and must 
allow nature to be subject to rights. Under this understanding, the Chamber 
considers it necessary to take a step forward in the jurisprudence towards 
the constitutional protection of one of our most important sources of biodi-
versity: the Atrato River. This interpretation finds full justification in the 
best interests of the environment that has been widely developed by con-
stitutional jurisprudence and that is made up of numerous constitutional 
clauses that constitute what has been called the ‘Ecological Constitution’ 
or ‘Green Constitution.’ This set of provisions makes it possible to affirm 
the transcendence of the healthy environment and the interdependent link 
with human beings and the State.371 
The Court promotes a new orientation of human appreciation towards the 
natural world, and wants it written into law. The Court is careful to ground this 
legal leap in the plight of a poverty-stricken minority population, abandoned by 
the government, impaired by illegal activities, and suffering environmental 
health problems they are powerless to stop on their own.372 Rather than simple 
orders demanding cleanup of a River—difficult to do, given the scope of legal 
and illegal mining and logging, and unlikely, given the Government’s preoccu-
pation with only utilitarian values of nature373—the Court opts for a new legal 
form to transform Colombians’ relationships with nature.374 
Thus, finally, the Court declares: “The Atrato River, its basin and tributar-
ies will be recognized as an entity subject to rights of protection, conservation, 
maintenance and restoration by the State and ethnic communities. . . . Conse-
quently, the Court will order the national government to exercise legal guardian-
ship and representation of the rights of the river . . . .”375 Legal guardians will be 
drawn from government appointees, a committee representative of the affected 
populations, and ecological experts.376 As a result of the ruling, the Government 
designated the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development to repre-
sent it, and each of seven River communities appointed one male and one female 
guardian to develop a plan to implement the Court’s ruling.377  
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The Court sees itself as protecting all human members of the affected com-
munities, not merely the plaintiffs in the instant case.378 The Río Atrato does not 
gain new property rights–it does not own itself, nor do local communities come 
to own it—but it becomes an entity whose well-being the law now must consider, 
i.e. it is a subject of legal rights and obligations.379 It remains to be seen how the 
new governance model devised to account for the River’s (and associated com-
munities’) health does, in fact, improve the interrelated, ecological community 
functions. 
When I asked him where he derived the idea of legal personhood for the 
Río Atrato, Justice Palacio said, “Let me tell you . . . that I did not take this from 
Aladdin’s Lamp.”380 The Justice noted that while granting a river legal person-
hood was a new concept for Colombia, it was not elsewhere in the world.381 He 
was struck by an Indian judge’s opinion referring to “our brothers the trees and 
our sisters the flowers.”382 The judge singles out the influence of ecocentric phi-
losophy, “where human beings are one more species of the planet, just like fauna, 
flora, and other species.”383 The Justice and his colleagues noticed that “if the 
progressive logging of trees and environmental damage continues, in fifty years 
that zone, which is perhaps the second most biodiverse on planet earth, will be a 
desert” and “this is, in broad strokes, the message, the philosophy of the judg-
ment.”384 
The Justice pointed out to me that the Atrato is far from the only river suf-
fering from environmental contamination, and this decision could be extended to 
those rivers and to other ecosystem entities.385 With this decision, the Justice’s 
“interest is to send the message: to preserve life. Not just the life of human be-
ings, rather all of life on planet earth.”386 Justice Palacio said that progress is 
being made (albeit slowly, due to lack of resources) to fulfill the goals of his 
judgment, monitored by the Constitutional Court.387 As Justice Palacio desired, 
four separate courts in Colombia have followed the Constitutional Court’s lead 
and declared that particular rivers have rights, with concrete remedies ranging 
from injunctions against pollution, orders to the government to protect the eco-
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logical resources, and establishment of local commissions of guardians to over-
see protections of the rivers.388 The Colombian Supreme Court has recently de-
clared that the entire Colombian Amazon is “an entity, subject of rights, and ben-
eficiary of the protection, conservation, maintenance, and restoration” that the 
Constitution obliges the government to provide.389 The Court ordered the formu-
lation of an “Intergenerational Pact for the Life of the Colombian Amazon” as 
part of its remedies to realize the Amazon’s (and the young people who brought 
the case) rights.390 Justice Palacio informed me that a reform to the Constitution 
has been introduced that would establish nature’s rights directly.391 
And so, the Colombian Justices confronted–including in person–the deplor-
able poverty of the minority communities, in part caused by the deplorable state 
of the Río.392 And that deplorable condition is due in part to the government’s 
abandonment of these communities over environmental ravages wrought by ille-
gal (and legal) logging and mining.393 Justice Palacio emphasized to me that the 
Court was particularly appalled at this nation’s blind eye towards these condi-
tions, as “this does not occur in Germany, this does not occur in France, this does 
not occur because over there are governments that preserve their territory, they 
preserve nature.”394 The Court’s detailed awareness that these communities es-
pecially depend on the natural world for their sustenance takes legal root in the 
Colombian Constitution’s commitment to SRL, which is partly grounded on an 
extensive “Ecological Constitution” supporting dignified lives, with ample do-
mestic and international precedent to support the right to a healthy environment.   
All of this need not have necessarily resulted in a remedy that establishes 
legal rights for Rivers. But the Court is clearly struck by the turn towards eco-
centrism in philosophy, is aware of emerging jurisprudence on rights for nonhu-
man entities in other jurisdictions, clearly believes that the world needs to de-
velop an attitude of deep respect and humility for the nonhuman world, and 
clearly is disgusted by humans’ (and the Colombian government’s) appreciation 
of nature only for the anthropocentric or egocentric utility it provides to us.395 
Finally, in my interview with him, the Chief Justice seems aware that in making 
the Río Atrato a subject (and not merely an object) of legal protections, he is 
drawing from and contributing to a growing legal movement to grant rights to 
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nonhuman entities, thus helping build a movement to root a deeper respect for 
the nature that supports us in firm legal ground.396 
C. Australia 
Australia, unlike New Zealand, has not entered into any treaties with any 
of its First Nations Peoples.397 This, however, has not stopped indigenous and 
non-indigenous communities advocating for legal rights for ecosystems and na-
ture, and for creating new laws that respect the connection First Nations Peoples 
have with their traditional lands.398 
1. Yarra River/Victoria 
The State of Victoria’s Yarra River Protection (Wilip-gin Birrarung mur-
ron) Act 2017 recognizes the Yarra as “one living, natural entity.”399 The Act’s 
Aboriginal title means “keep the Birrarung alive.”400 It is Australia’s first piece 
of English/Aboriginal language legislation, and puts the relationship of Aborig-
inals to the River at the center of the Act, comparable to the Whanganui settle-
ment.401 The Act begins with Wujundjeri text, part of which reads, in translation: 
“The Birrarung is alive, has a heart, a spirit and is part of our Dreaming. We have 
lived with and known the Birrarung since the beginning. We will always know 
the Birrarung. . . . Since our beginning it has been known that we have an obli-
gation to keep the Birrarung alive and healthy—for all generations to come.”402 
The Act lays out a set of environmental and social principles to guide de-
velopment of the Yarra River corridor.403 The Act recognizes the “role of the 
traditional owners as custodians of the Yarra River land” as well as the “cultural 
diversity and heritage of post-European settlement communities.”404 That is, 
while the Act acknowledges the traditional owners, those communities will share 
responsibilities with the descendants of more recent arrivals.405 
Unlike the New Zealand statutes, the legislation neither grants the River 
legal personhood nor appoints a specific legal guardian.406 The Act does create 
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an independent Birrarung Council,407 “the Voice of the River” appointed by the 
Environment Minister.408 To maintain autonomy, the Council has no government 
representatives.409 It includes at least two Aboriginal traditional custodians, in 
addition to representatives from environmental groups, agricultural interests, and 
at least two “skill-based” representatives (e.g. environmental planners)410 to 
speak for the River.411 The Council’s mandate is “to provide independent advice” 
to the Minister for Water, Planning, and Environment “on significant activities, 
issues and plans concerning the Yarra River and its lands . . . .”412 Thus, unlike 
the New Zealand agreements granting legal personhood to Te Urewera and the 
Whanganui River, the role of the Yarra River’s spokescouncil is only advisory: 
the needs of the River itself will still be competing with the needs of the humans 
who also prize it as a resource.413 
While the Council does not speak directly as the River, it is envisioned to 
play a strong advisory and advocacy role.414 An extensive community engage-
ment project is underway to advise the draft Strategic Plan the Act requires.415 
But the Council is not the body that is writing the 10-year strategic plan and fifty-
year community vision – the lead agency is Melbourne Water.416 Their initial 
preliminary reports on their strategic plan shows widespread community input, 
but also a complicated administrative structure serving multiple constituencies, 
including fifteen government agencies, Aboriginal Traditional Owners, and the 
statutorily constituted Birrarung Council, which the plan says is “colloquially 
known as ‘the Voice of the River.’”417 
Dr. Erin O’Donnell, a water law expert who currently serves as one of the 
eleven appointees, told me the Council is meeting regularly, and is still delineat-
ing how, specifically, they will speak on behalf of the Yarra River.418 Thus, it 
remains to be seen how the body who speaks for the River’s needs will express 
that voice. Nonetheless, O’Donnell stresses that “If through the Birrarung coun-
cil First Nations and all Yarra river stakeholders can come together, this could 
be a powerful model for the rest of Australia. . . . It can be used as a genuine 
move towards reconciliation. It’s a pathway to legitimacy for holistic views of 
the river and acknowledgment of First Nations.”419 
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2. Fitzroy-Mardoowaara 
Australia has a long way to go to effect that reconciliation.  Australia does 
not yet have any legislation or court cases that change the legal status of nature 
from being human property.420 Some scholars and activists see rights for rivers, 
and rights for traditional custodians to speak for rivers, as a potentially useful 
approach for securing greater protection for the environment and increased 
recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal laws.421 
In Dark Emu, a 2014 best-selling book that has created a paradigm shift in 
the way many Australians think about Aboriginal societies, Bruce Pascoe de-
scribes the deep Aboriginal connections to the land that the colonizers de-
stroyed.422 Pascoe documents “a much more complicated Aboriginal economy 
than the primitive hunter-gatherer lifestyle we had been told was the simple lot 
of Australia’s First People.”423 Rather than “hapless opportunism” in their rela-
tions with the environment,424 Aborigines in Australia had developed careful, 
sophisticated, ecologically sensible agriculture, aquaculture and hunting.425 The 
colonists did not recognize clear evidence of an advanced civilization “that was 
neither pristine nor wild”:426 it was neither convenient nor psychologically pru-
dent for them to do so, as “few were in Australia to marvel at a new civilization; 
they were here to replace it.”427  
Pascoe documents extensively that:  
[O]ne of the most fundamental differences between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people is the understanding of the relationship between people 
and the land. Earth is the mother. Aboriginal people are born of the earth, 
and individuals within the clan had responsibilities for particular streams, 
grasslands, trees, crops, animals, and even seasons. The life of the clan was 
devoted to continuance.428 
Pascoe advises that “[i]f we could reform our view of how Aboriginal peo-
ple were managing the national economy prior to colonization, it might lead us 
to reform the ways we currently use resources and care for the land.”429 Legal 
reforms that recognize Aboriginal cultural understandings of their relationship 
with the Earth are one step in this process. As Pascoe points out, it may be a step 
as important for the colonizers as it is for the colonized: “It’s not the difference 
between capitalism and communism; it’s the difference between capitalism and 
Aboriginalism” that threatens our future.430 
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Australia has not made the same efforts as New Zealand to atone for the 
colonizers’ damages; they have not gone as far in the movement of legal rights 
for rivers.431 But some Australian groups see this international legal movement 
as holding promise for their own efforts to reclaim sovereignty over their rela-
tionships with the land.432 In addition to what’s been achieved on the Yarra 
River, other indigenous Australians are striving to have rights declared for rivers, 
and for their ability to speak for those rivers.433 For example, the concept of rec-
ognizing the rights of a river to exist, thrive and evolve is being explored for the 
Margaret River, in South Western Australia.434 
In Australia’s northwest, the Nyikina and other Aboriginal groups are ad-
vocating for recognition of legal rights for the Fitzroy River (“Mardoowarra” in 
the local language).435 In the “Fitzroy River Declaration,” traditional owners de-
clare that “[t]he Fitzroy River is a living ancestral being and has a right to life.”436 
The groups speak of “First Laws,” i.e. the laws of the Aboriginal people that long 
preceded the Western laws that have devastated both Aboriginal culture and the 
land they stewarded for millennia.437 Like the Māori, they see the river as a “liv-
ing ancestral being” and “that the river gives life and has the right to life.”438 
Establishing legal rights for the Mardoowarra is just one element of their broader 
desire to “fulfill their birthright and duty to collectively and holistically manage 
river country as an integrated whole.”439 They have established the Mar-
turwarra440 Fitzroy River Council, which they wish to see recognized as the 
group that will speak for the River, i.e. to oversee and help regulate inappropriate 
development along the Fitzroy.441 Most recently, the Council has met with cattle 
industry representatives to try to find common ground on plans to establish large-
scale irrigation for cattle ranchers, which most of the local Aboriginal groups 
oppose.442 
Dr. Anne Poelina is a Nyikina scholar and leader who lauds “the Yarra 
river’s right to life as a legal precedent for new laws to protect our Australian 
rivers which are the arteries of our nation. As my elders constantly remind me: 
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no river, no people, no life!”443 Dr. Poelina refers to New Zealand’s legal rights 
for the Whanganui as a model that Australia should be following.444 On behalf 
of her people, she brought the case of Mardoowara v. the State of Western Aus-
tralia before the Australian People’s Tribunal for Community and Nature’s 
Rights “to ask the citizens of this court to recognize me as a living entity with a 
right to life, like my sister, the Whanganui River in New Zealand.”445 She is 
leading her community on behalf of the Mardoowara “to be protected as a sacred 
river with the right to life for generations to come.”446 A film she produced about 
the effort proclaims that the: 
Whanganui River has stood strong and with the help of her indigenous 
guardians and the strength and wisdom of their legal and cultural govern-
ance, she now has set international legal precedence across Mother Earth.  
Her rights in nature gives me hope in human beings, who hold the lives of 
other nonhuman beings, the birds, the trees, the rocks, the insects and the 
balance of life in their hands.447 
Dr. Poelina speaks of ancient Aboriginal lore as law.448 Through genera-
tions of interactions with the country, her people have crafted stories of what the 
River and the land needs and wants.449 These stories, this lore, describes and 
prescribes acceptable interactions with the land through lore.450 Dr. Poelina ex-
plained to me that seeking legal rights for the Mardoowarra is just one strategy 
in the communities’ attempts to have their relationship with the river sanctified 
in the law.451 They are seeking self-determination, where part of “self” is their 
connectedness with the nonhuman world around them, with the concomitant 
ability to speak on behalf of that relationship in a region that is undergoing rapid, 
unsustainable development.452 Using the River as leverage is not disingenuous, 
given the role of the River in the groups’ deeply rooted cultural and ecological 
history on the continent.453 Advocating for recognition of nature’s rights to exist 
and thrive, and aligning with the international rights of nature movement, is just 
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one of many strategies some Aboriginal groups are employing to translate their 
ancient law into a language that can be understood by Western law.454 
3. Great Barrier Reef 
Among the many efforts to protect the imperiled Great Barrier Reef, law-
yers from the Australian Earth Laws Alliance (“AELA”) drafted model laws to 
demonstrate how the rights of the Great Barrier Reef could be recognized in Aus-
tralian law.455 AELA drafted a model law for the State of Queensland, which 
states it is “[a]n Act to recognize the legal rights of the Great Barrier Reef.”456 
They also drafted a model amendment with parallel requirements for the Com-
monwealth Constitution, and an innovative model Local Law.457 The models 
were inspired by both the global movement to recognize the rights of rivers and 
other ecosystems, and also the approach pioneered by the Community Environ-
mental Legal Defense Fund (“CELDF”), in the United States, which helps com-
munities assert both the legal rights of nature and the legal rights of local com-
munities to protect nature.458 Like the New Zealand agreements, which clearly 
inspire this legislation,459 the Act seeks to recognize “that the Great Barrier Reef 
is an indivisible living being with legal rights” and to secure “the inherent rights 
of the Great Barrier Reef to naturally exist, flourish, regenerate, and evolve, and 
its right to restoration and recovery.”460 
More than any extant statute protecting the Reef, this proposed law delineates 
what it would mean to achieve these rights. The Act stresses that the Reef has 
the right to: 
(a) naturally exist, flourish, regenerate, and evolve, and to restoration and 
recovery; (b) a healthy, stable climate system free from human-caused cli-
mate change pollution and emissions. This includes the right to be free 
from human activities that contribute to climate change, including fossil 
fuel extraction and development; (c) a healthy environment, including the 
right to clean air and clean water, free from human-caused pollution in-
cluding sediments, nutrients, and pesticides; and (d) a vibrant and bio-
diverse community of life that is not depleted by unsustainable fishing.461 
And like the New Zealand statutes, the model law would deed some of the rights 
to care for the Reef to the traditional custodians with historical stewardship 
ties.462 The Act recognizes and respects “that First Nations Peoples, who have 
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cared for land and sea country of the Great Barrier Reef for millennia, have the 
right to speak for country and defend their ancestral lands from unwanted devel-
opments and environmental harm.”463 The model law and Constitutional amend-
ments have pragmatic procedural corollaries: allowing representatives to initiate 
legislation on the Reef’s behalf, and reversing the burden of proof so that devel-
opment proponents would have to affirmatively show that their actions would 
not harm the Reef.464 
Australia is at an inflection point both in how to make amends for the col-
onizers’ (and present day) appalling mistreatments of Aboriginal people, and 
how to manage their degrading resource base.465 Australians have lagged behind 
their neighbor New Zealand in both endeavors.466 Activists suggest that follow-
ing their neighbor’s model in granting legal personhood to nonhuman entities, 
with traditional custodians taking the lead in speaking for what the nonhuman 
entity (and thus the human community) wants, is a way to synergistically achieve 
both ends.467 
D. Ecuador 
Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution elaborates the notion of “El buen vivir,” 
which requires “persons, communities, peoples and nationalities to effectively 
exercise their rights and fulfill their responsibilities within the framework of in-
terculturalism, respect for their diversity, and harmonious coexistence with na-
ture.”468 The president of the Constitutional Assembly charged with drafting the 
new constitution collaborated with the U.S.-based Community Environmental 
Legal Defense Fund, environmental NGOs, and indigenous groups to draft rights 
of nature provisions into the Constitution.469 They found that the idea of provid-
ing for the legal recognition of rights of nature was consistent with the worldview 
of Ecuador’s indigenous peoples.470 
Chapter 7 of the Constitution describes these fundamental rights: “Nature 
or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist, persist, 
and maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its evolu-
tionary processes.”471 As part of “buen vivir,” the State must guarantee the rights 
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of nature.472 The Constitution requires a duty of all Ecuadorian citizens to “re-
spect the rights of nature, preserve a healthy environment and use natural re-
sources rationally, sustainably and durably.”473 The Constitution mandates the 
State to actively promote buen vivir, including guaranteeing the rights of na-
ture,474 and must support “forms of production that assure the good way of living 
of the population and shall discourage those that violate their rights or those of 
nature . . . .”475 
The first successful476 rights of nature court case arose from this Constitu-
tional provision.477 The Provincial Court in Loja ruled construction waste had 
been impermissibly bulldozed into the Vilcabamba River. The court held that 
“[i]t is the duty of constitutional judges to immediately guard and to give effect 
to the constitutional rights of nature,” and ordered the defendants to remediate 
their mess and go through proper channels to obtain permits for their work.478 
More recently, the Ministry of the Environment noted the rights of nature 
provisions of the Constitution when denying a request to build a dolphinarium.479 
But that is a rare success in Ecuador. According to Erin O’Donnell, the Vil-
cabamba decision created “new legal rights, but no new outcomes.”480 No one 
enforced the order and “the new legal rights for nature did not create any new 
solutions to the existing problems facing environmental protection in law.”481 In 
the Vilcabamba River case, when the construction company continued to violate 
the order, the NGO could not afford to sue them a second time, and the govern-
ment failed to intervene.482 
I have been to Ecuador since the Constitutional reforms and have seen some 
of the most horrific hellscapes on Earth as the nation drills for oil in some of the 
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planet’s most biodiverse regions.483 Rights for nature is no legal panacea: obvi-
ously, creating any legal rights, never mind novel rights for non-human entities, 
requires capacity to enforce compliance with those rights.484 
E. India 
In two cases in 2017, the High Court of Uttarakhand developed the rights 
of nature doctrine in the State.485 The Court declared that: 
[T]he Rivers Ganga and Yamuna, all their tributaries, streams, every natu-
ral water flowing with flow continuously or intermittently of these Rivers 
are declared as juristic/legal persons/living entities having the status of a 
legal person with all corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a living 
person in order to preserve and conserve River Ganga and Yamuna.486 
As precedent, the judge reviews cases where Indian courts held that idols or de-
ities are juristic persons that can hold property.487 As we’ve seen elsewhere, the 
Court is compelled to link both spiritual and ecological dependence of human 
communities to the Rivers: 
All Hindus have deep Astha [faith] in Rivers Ganga and Yamuna and they 
collectively connect with these Rivers. Rivers Ganga and Yamuna are cen-
tral to the existence of half of Indian population and their health and well 
being. The Rivers have provided both physical and spiritual sustenance to 
all of us from time immemorial.488 
Rather than create new bodies to act as the human face of the Rivers, the Court 
instructs various government officials to act “in loco parentis as the human face 
to protect, conserve, and preserve” the Rivers.489 That would be a potential short-
coming of the ruling, had it gone into effect: the same government bodies are 
currently failing to protect these rivers.490 
More remarkably, in a different case, the same court attempts to extend the 
bounds of legal personhood even further.491 After surveying the alarming status 
of shrinking glaciers, park encroachment, and deforestation, noting the particular 
threats that climate change poses to the people and ecosystems of India, the Court 
rehearses a variety of poetic prose from Indian and foreign authors (including 
Kenyan Nobel Peace Prize winner Wangari Maathai), scientific descriptions of 
affected ecosystems, and international legal instruments (e.g. the 1992 Earth 
Summit, the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species).492 The 
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Court cites favorably the New Zealand statute granting Te Urewera legal person-
hood.493 Invoking the doctrine of parens patriae, i.e. the ability of the state to act 
to protect a person needing such protection, the Court concludes by declaring: 
[T]he Glaciers . . . rivers, streams, rivulets, lakes, air, meadows, dales, jun-
gles, forests wetlands, grasslands, springs and waterfalls [are a] legal per-
son/juristic person/juridicial person/moral person/artificial person having 
the status of a legal person, with all corresponding rights duties and liabil-
ities of a living person, in order to preserve and conserve them.494 
The State government of Uttarakhand appealed the rulings, fearing that people 
would actually sue the rivers when they caused damage, and noting that the law 
would be difficult to enforce because the Rivers flowed beyond the State’s bor-
ders.495 The Indian Supreme Court agreed, and overruled the designation.496 
F. Bangladesh 
In July 2019, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh made its nation the first to 
grant full legal personhood to all of its rivers.497 The Court noted that “[w]ater is 
likely to be the most pressing environmental concern of the next century,” and 
called for rivers to be protected “at all costs.”498 Decrying the polluted status of 
the nation’s rivers upon which citizens intimately depend, the Court cites the 
Colombian Río Atrato case, Ecuador’s Constitution, and the Te Urewera and 
Whanganui cases from New Zealand.499 As in the Indian rivers case above, var-
ious government officials are named in loco parentis to protect the newly human 
entities.500 
The Court ordered the government-appointed National River Conservation 
Commission to act as guardian of the rivers, including being able to take polluters 
to court to defend a river’s right to life.501 Activists in Bangladesh note that, 
unlike in New Zealand (or Colombia or Australia), the Court did not appoint 
local citizens as representatives or stakeholders of the Rivers; this makes local, 
poor, riverine citizens vulnerable to eviction of they are polluting rivers—as 
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many of them inevitably are.502 The National Rivers Commission Chairman 
avers, “[p]rotecting the rivers also means protecting the entire eco-system, which 
includes fishermen and farmers who live on the banks. Their rights will also be 
protected.”503 Also, of course, a problem with rivers is that they choose to trans-
cend boundaries: no one in Bangladesh can sanction India if it fouls transbound-
ary waterways.504 It remains to be seen how these new legal protections will play 
out in a nation with a rapidly growing population, facing some of the world’s 
gravest land loss from rising sea levels.505 
G. United States 
The CELDF has spearheaded most of the several dozen local level Rights 
of Nature ordinances in the United States.506 So, for example, recognizing that 
“[l]ike all other communities, Santa Monica’s welfare is inextricably bound to 
the welfare of the natural environment,” the City’s 2013 Resolution declares both 
that citizens have rights to a healthy environment, but also that “[n]atural com-
munities and ecosystems possess fundamental and inalienable rights to exist and 
flourish in the City of Santa Monica” and that “residents of the City may bring 
actions to protect groundwater aquifers, atmospheric systems, marine waters, and 
native species within the boundaries of the City.”507 The City continues to rely 
on and reiterate this Resolution in its new Sustainable Rights Ordinance, and in 
its recent prohibitions on private water wells.508 
Following episodes where Toledo, Ohio was forced to enact a drinking wa-
ter ban due to unsafe levels of toxins in Lake Erie on February 2019, 61.39% of 
the voters who showed up at the polls voted yes on the “Lake Erie Bill of 
Rights,”509 which would be the first U.S. law to grant rights to an ecosystem.510 
Explaining the rationale behind the initiative, an activist explained, “We’ve been 
using the same laws for decades to try and protect Lake Erie. They’re clearly not 
working.”511 The initiative specified the: 
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Rights of Lake Erie Ecosystem. Lake Erie, and the Lake Erie watershed, 
possess the right to exist, flourish, and naturally evolve. The Lake Erie 
Ecosystem shall include all natural water features, communities of organ-
isms, soil as well as terrestrial and aquatic sub ecosystems that are part of 
Lake Erie and its watershed.512 
As one writer expresses it, when the voters approve of legal rights for Lake Erie, 
they assert that the Lake “is a living being not a bundle of ecosystem services” 
and thus “it displaces Erie from its instrumentalised roles as sump and source.”513 
Alleging that the initiative was “unconstitutional and unlawful,” a farmers’ 
group quickly filed an injunction, alleging that the initiative “exposes Drewes 
Farms to massive liability if Drewes Farms continues to fertilize its fields be-
cause it can never guarantee that all runoff will be prevented from entering the 
Lake Erie Watershed.”514 While the case was in process, the Ohio legislature 
passed a law stating: “Nature or any ecosystem does not have standing to partic-
ipate in or bring an action in any court of common pleas. No person, on behalf 
of or representing nature or an ecosystem, shall bring an action in any court of 
common pleas.”515 One news source cites a community activist saying “it doesn’t 
matter what happens in the courts in Toledo with this case, because the genie has 
been let out of the bottle. And as hard as they want to try to put it back in, the 
people shouldn’t let them . . . I mean, we have to change our environmental pro-
tection in this country and across the world, because obviously what we’re doing 
isn’t working.”516 In fact, a federal judge did invalidate the Lake Erie Bill of 
Rights, noting that while supporters of the initiative “used the democratic process 
to pursue a well-intentioned goal: the protection of Lake Erie,” the ordinance was 
“unconstitutionally vague and exceed[ed] the power of municipal government in 
Ohio.”517 
The genie may remain stopped up in the U.S., at least in the near future. In 
2017, the Colorado River Ecosystem (a group of “next friends,” the Deep Green 
Resistance, filing on its behalf)—“best understood as a complex collection of 
relationships”—sued the State of Colorado.518 Alleging that “Environmental 
Law has failed to protect the natural environment because it accepts the status of 
nature and ecosystems as property, while merely regulating the rate at which the 
natural environment is degraded,” the “Plaintiffs are asking this court to recog-
nize that the Colorado River is capable of possessing rights similar to a ‘person,’ 
and . . . that the Colorado River has certain rights to exist, flourish, regenerate, 
 
 512. BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 509. 
 513. Robert Macfalane, Should This Tree Have the Same Rights as You?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 2, 2019, 
7:00 AM) https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/nov/02/trees-have-rights-too-robert-macfarlane-on-the-
new-laws-of-nature [https://perma.cc/7DGF-87B4]. 
 514. Drewes Farms Partnership v. City of Toledo, 441 F. Supp. 3d 551 (N.D. Ohio 2020). 
 515. BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 509. 
 516. Westerman, supra note 482. 
 517. Drewes Farms, 441 F. Supp. 3d at 557–58. 
 518. Complaint at 3–4, Colorado River Ecosystem v. State of Colorado, 1:17-cv-02316 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 
2017). 
  
600 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
and evolve.”519 The complaint asserts that “[f]or the vast majority of human his-
tory, humans lived in humble relationships with natural communities,” now “the 
planet is on the verge of total collapse.”520 To avert this collapse, and citing Jus-
tice Douglas’ Supreme Court Dissent in Sierra Club. v. Morton, “[i]f American 
courts do not recognize the inherent worth of natural communities, the dominant 
culture will not change, and collapse will only intensify.”521 The plaintiffs cite 
the Colombian, Ecuadorian, Indian, and New Zealand cases analyzed in this Ar-
ticle as precedent for their request.522 
The Colorado Attorney General was not impressed, and forced the lawyer 
representing the Colorado River Ecosystem to withdraw the Complaint under 
threat of sanctions or disbarment.523 While she did “not doubt the personal con-
victions of those groups and individual who claimed to speak on behalf of the 
ecosystem,” the case nonetheless “unacceptably impugned the State’s sovereign 
authority to administer natural resources for public use, and was well beyond the 
jurisdiction of the judicial branch of government.”524 The plaintiffs were forced 
to file their own Motion to Dismiss, noting that theirs was a: 
[G]ood faith attempt to introduce the Rights of Nature doctrine into our 
jurisprudence . . . the expansion of rights is a difficult and legally complex 
matter. When engaged in an effort of first impression, the undersigned have 
an ethical duty to continuously ensure that conditions are appropriate for 
our judicial institution to best consider the merits of a new canon525 
Native Americans are also following the lead of successful rights of nature cases 
empowering indigenous groups elsewhere on the globe.526 The White Earth 
Band of Ojibwe in Minnesota passed a law granting wild rice its own legal 
rights.527 The Yurok Tribal Council of Western California voted unanimously 
for a resolution that granted rights to the Klamath River.528 The Resolution doc-
uments the Yurok’s deeply rooted connection to the River: 
The Yurok Tribe and its members have had a strong relationship with “We-
roy” also known as the Klamath River, since time immemorial and Yurok 
culture, ceremonies, religion, fisheries, subsistence, economics, residence, 
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and all other lifeways are intertwined with the health of the River, its eco-
system, and the multiple species reliant on a thriving Klamath River Eco-
system.529 
The Resolution details threats to the Klamath, and “establishes the Rights of the 
Klamath River to exist, flourish, and naturally evolve; to have a clean and healthy 
environment free from pollutants; to have a stable climate free from human-
caused climate change impacts; and to be free from contamination by genetically 
engineered organisms.”530 The Resolution concludes with a “written notice” to 
governments and anyone else who endanger the River “that it has become nec-
essary to provide a legal basis to protect the Klamath River, its ecosystem, and 
species for the continuation of the Yurok people and Tribe for future genera-
tions,” and promises a follow-up ordinance codifying the Resolution.531 
These resolutions remain, for the moment, as symbolic statements: they ex-
press an ontology that the tribes wish to see translated into law.532 Rights of na-
ture resolutions, Constitutional amendments, or statutes have been passed in Bo-
livia (the first Constitutional proclamation of nature’s rights, it has done little 
meaningful legal work);533 Crestone, Colorado;534 Paudalho, Brazil;535 Colima, 
Mexico;536 Murcia, Spain,537 and Frome, UK,538 with similar actions in process 
in Lennik, Belgium, Civita Castellana, Italy (seeking to declare itself the world’s 
first “Nature’s Rights Zone”), São Paulo & Brumadinho, Brazil (for the Capa-
baribe River), the Laguna El Espino in El Salvador, and Ethiopia’s River Ethi-
ope.539 Uganda’s 2019 National Environment Act declares that “nature has the 
right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions 
and its processes in evolution”, and that “a person has a right to bring an action 
before a competent court for any infringement of rights of Nature under this 
Act.”540 These actions often cross reference each other, aspirationally spinning a 
web of ecological interrelationship between legal systems.541 It remains to be 
seen how many of these instances are symbolic, and how many lead to genuine 
legal, ecological, and cultural changes. 
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IV. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? 
So: are we the River? 
This is a study of how we view our relationship to the nonhuman world 
around us. What we value and how we value the natural world will dictate how 
we do or do not care for the natural world, which will shape the natural world 
itself, which, in turn, shapes our values. Our values become rooted in our laws, 
which themselves shape our obligations (or lack thereof) towards the natural 
world. The circles may be virtuous or vicious, depending on the parameters of 
the law and the evolving values that inform it and flow from it. 
Environmental laws are thus informed by and further reinforce how mem-
bers of a society view their relationship with the nonhuman world.542 Even our 
foremost protective environmental laws that have cleaned air and water, pro-
tected species, etc. usually convey dominion or separation: the environment re-
mains a set of resources for us to manipulate at will or fence off when we want 
to protect.543 These laws seldom suppose a web of relationships for us to partic-
ipate in, or a series of interrelated systems for us to sustain for their own sake.544 
Rights for rivers may, possibly, reconceive those relationships and thus recon-
ceive our laws. 
Speaking for the river or mountain means speaking for ecosystem health, 
for abundant life with a diversity of species, for ecosystem resilience in the face 
of multiple, synergistic human pressures. When reconceived, nonhuman nature 
is no longer simply human property, but has rights of its own, we simply must 
consider its needs when we act. We could achieve ecosystem resilience without 
granting legal personhood to a given nonhuman entity: we just haven’t, hardly 
ever, hardly anywhere.545 
Advocates portrayed here recognize this failure and want us to think bigger, 
and escape the myopic lens where to the extent we think about nature, even in 
environmental laws, we think of how to conserve it for our own use.546 They 
want us to think of ourselves as fundamentally interconnected with the planet’s 
life systems and to legislate as if ecosystem health (and therefore our own health) 
matters.547 The Deep Ecology movement that gained prominence in the 1970s 
and 1980s urged a similar movement “to reawaken our understanding of Earth 
wisdom,” “to accept the invitation to the dance–the dance of unity of humans, 
plants, animals, the Earth.”548 
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But the Deep Ecologists were also profoundly anti-human.549 The advo-
cates I describe here are architects of a new regime that constructs in the law a 
new version of the human/planet relationship.550 Unlike the Deep Ecologists or 
some other environmentalists who promote biodiversity conservation no matter 
what the cost to humans, many of these initiatives give precedence to local and/or 
indigenous communities to speak for the nonhuman entities’ rights and to regain 
some control over the natural ecosystems that sustain their communities.551 
Some of these pioneering legal innovations draw from and simultaneously honor 
indigenous understandings of the human/nature bond. Even typing “human/na-
ture” supposes that these things are extricable. And, at least currently in New 
Zealand, and aspirationally in Colombia, Australia, and elsewhere, this recogni-
tion is paired with real legal power to manage the landscape according to cultural 
precepts: Indigenous ideas about nature are written into law and will, in turn 
shape nature going forward, which will, in turn, shape our views of nature in 
complex dialectic.   
Many of these initiatives empower indigenous groups, or other communi-
ties with long histories as stewards and “traditional ecological knowledge”552 of 
newly empowered nonhuman entities. As far as I can discern, the models thus 
far escape the fallacy of the “ecological noble savage,” i.e. the myth that all pre-
Industrial communities lived in blissful, sustainable harmony with the natural 
world around them.553 Certainly, some Indigenous communities have been 
granted control of their own resource base, with denuded, ecologically dead for-
ests resulting.554 But the initiatives here that grant cultural and thus management 
primacy to indigenous and/or local communities make compelling cases that 
these communities’ worldviews and histories (as marginalized, as stewards) earn 
them the authority to speak for and thus manage the rivers and mountains that 
sustain them. It is thought they will manage nature as if their lives depended on 
it, because their lives depend on it.555 
The model, however, is transferrable even where these communities do not 
thrive or survive. I’m not original in suggesting this: Christopher Stone was there 
decades ago when he proposed that trees and other nonhuman entities should 
 
 549. At a conference I attended at UC Santa Cruz in 1999, Devall and Sessions revealed themselves to be 
explicitly misogynistic, anti-Semitic, and generally anti-human. There are many critiques of Deep Ecology. See, 
e.g., Ramachandra Guha, Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World 
Critique, 11 ENV. ETHICS71 (1989). 
 550. See supra Part II. 
 551. See supra Part II. 
 552. Víctor Toledo, Indigenous Peoples and Biodiversity, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIODIVERSITY 269 (2d ed. 
1999); Joan McGregor, Towards a Philosophical Understanding of TEK and Ecofeminism, in TRADITIONAL 
ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 109, 109–28 (Melissa K. Nelson and Dan Shilling eds., 2018). 
 553. For a comprehensive critique of this view, see Shepard Krech III, The Ecological Indian: Myth and 
History (1999). For a review of the literature on this, see Raymond Hames, The Ecologically Noble Savage De-
bate, 36 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOL. 177 (2007). 
 554. Kent H. Redford, The Ecologically Noble Savage, CULTURAL SURVIVAL (Mar. 1991), https://www. 
culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/ecologically-noble-savage [https://perma.cc/E6YK-
2NLR].  
 555. See supra Part III. 
  
604 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
have legal standing with guardians to represent their interests in court.556 But 
perhaps it’s time to devolve guardianship or spokespersonship to teams of al-
lies/advocates who will speak for the natural world due to their intimate connec-
tion and knowledge thereof. Sportspersons, hikers, scientists, birders, local na-
ture enthusiasts could–and should–be fiduciaries, empowered to act as trustees 
for rivers and mountains and ecosystems. Of course, it is possible that some of 
the communities described here will mismanage resources, or future initiatives 
will assign inapposite guardians. We will have to stay tuned. 
To label these legal innovations as “ecocentric”557 or “anthropocentric” 
misses the point. We may believe that healthy nonhuman ecosystems have an 
inherent right to flourish, or we may believe that sustaining ecosystem health 
makes it more likely that human communities will survive and even thrive in the 
Anthropocene.558 If we are the river and the river is us, then the environmental 
philosophies underlying these legal reforms are an eco-anthropocentric hybrid. 
The river still serves human needs, but the humans who depend on the river also 
serve the river’s needs.   
Our current legal systems usually start by asking “what do we need?” and 
then slots in some provisions for the planet when not too inconvenient or expen-
sive.559 The initiatives portrayed here reach for a system of law where we ask, 
first and foremost: what does the planet need–and, therefore, ineluctably, what 
do we need?  
These legal innovations comprise fundamental elements of an Earth juris-
prudence. They are Earth-centric, where humans are but one cog in the Earth 
system. They recognize–indeed, require–that we root our laws in the fundamen-
tal interdependence between human and nonhuman communities. When the 
Whanganui or Yarra or Atrato or Ganges Rivers gain “legal personhood,” this 
simply means that their interests matter, rather than only our interests in them 
mattering. Even the most ardent anthropocentrist (or egocentrist) cannot pursue 
their own interests if the river, or mountain, or lake, or reef do not have their 
interests considered, because these entities are the matrices that sustain human 
lives. The schemes here simply put the nonhuman interests first, or on the same 
footing as our own interests. These initiatives are about relationship between the 
human and nonhuman, recognizing first that the relationship exists, and then rec-
ognizing that we are fundamentally dependent on the continued health and flour-
ishing of the nonhuman world. Law just is catching up to this inexorable fact. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Can rivers tell us what they want? I believe they do, if we are heeding. In 
his book, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice, Cormac Cullinan writes: 
 
 556. Steve Pavlik, Should Trees Have Legal Standing in Indian Country?, 30 WICAZO SA REV. 7, 8–9 
(2015). 
 557. O’Donnell & Macpherson, supra note 108, at 37. 
 558. For a discussion of who should be empowered to speak for biodiversity in an environmental democ-
racy, see David Takacs, Whose Voices Count in Biodiversity Conservation?, supra note 25. 
 559. See supra Part II. 
  
No. 2] WE ARE THE RIVER 605 
Fortunately rivers communicate rather a lot about their essential natures. 
We know that they need to flow, tend to rush over rocks in a highly oxy-
genated, high-energy flurry in their upper reaches, and have a distinct in-
clination to meander languidly in their lower reaches. They create micro-
climate and Riverine ecosystems along their banks and they flood from 
time to time, compensating for what they destroy with rich silt and demar-
cating a flood plain as their territory. In other words, a flooding River is 
almost certainly acting in accordance with its nature.560 
What rivers want should be what we want, if we want to sustain the nonhuman 
world that sustains us.  
For New Zealand’s Māori or Australia’s Aborigines, or the Afro-Caribbean 
communities in Colombia’s Chacó, there may be some cognitive or ontological 
dissonance trying to mesh two distinct worldviews into a legal regime that re-
spects cultural cosmology and at the same time remains recognizable to Western 
legal traditions. It is difficult to turn the autochthonous lore of the land into the 
modern law of the land. But for them and for the rest of us, the resulting hybrid 
provides a way forward, no matter what our spiritual or cultural understanding. 
We see only the inklings of how these new legal initiatives will (or won’t) trans-
form human and nonhuman communities, so stay tuned. But I believe that seeing 
ourselves as an interconnected part of the ecological world can only lead us to 
see that taking care of the world around us is taking care of ourselves. We are 
the river, and the river is us. When we realize this, and derive ways to root this 
epiphany in law, we will find sustainable ways forward for human civilization. 
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